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GHSA-h756-wh59-hhjv

HIGH

Grav vulnerable to Path traversal / arbitrary YAML write via user creation leading to Account Takeover / System Corruption

Also known asCVE-2025-66295
Published
Dec 2, 2025
Updated
Dec 2, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk37th percentile+0.36%
0.00%0.32%0.64%0.96%0.1%0.5%Jan 26Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘getgrav/grav

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a user with privilege of user creation creates a new user through the Admin UI and supplies a username containing path traversal sequences (for example ..\Nijat or ../Nijat), Grav writes the account YAML file to an unintended path outside user/accounts/. The written YAML can contain account fields such as email, fullname, twofa_secret, and hashed_password. In my tests, I was able to cause the Admin UI to write the following content into arbitrary .yaml files (including files like email.yaml, system.yaml, or other site YAML files like admin.yaml) — demonstrating arbitrary YAML write / overwrite via the Admin UI.

Example observed content written by the Admin UI (test data): username: ..\Nijat state: enabled email: [email protected] fullname: 'Nijat Alizada' language: en content_editor: default twofa_enabled: false twofa_secret: RWVEIHC2AFVD6FCR6UHCO3DS4HWXKKDT avatar: { } hashed_password: $2y$10$wl9Ktv3vUmDKCt8o6u2oOuRZr1I04OE0YZf2sJ1QcAherbNnk1XVC access: site: login: true

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Log in to the Grav Admin UI as an administrator.
  2. Create a new user with the following values (example): a. Username: ..\POC-TOKEN-2025-09-29 b. Fullname: POC-TOKEN-2025-09-29 c. Email: [email protected] d. Password: (any password) Observe that a YAML file containing the POC-TOKEN is written outside user/accounts/ (for example in the parent directory of user/accounts)

Impact

  1. Config corruption / service disruption: Overwriting system.yaml, email.yaml, or plugin config files with attacker-controlled YAML (even if limited to fields present in account YAML) could break functionality, disable services, or cause misconfiguration requiring recovery from backups.
  2. Account takeover, any user with create user privilege can modify other user's email and password by just creating a new user with the name "..\accounts\USERNAME_OF_VICTIM"

Proof of Concept

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf503d74-f765-4031-8e22-71f6b3630847

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistgetgrav/gravall versions1.8.0-beta.27

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for getgrav/grav. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update getgrav/grav to 1.8.0-beta.27 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h756-wh59-hhjv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h756-wh59-hhjv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-h756-wh59-hhjv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a user with privilege of user creation creates a new user through the Admin UI and supplies a username containing path traversal sequences (for example ..\Nijat or ../Nijat), Grav writes the account YAML file to an unintended path outside user/accounts/. The written YAML can contain account fields such as email, fullname, twofa_secret, and hashed_password. In my tests, I was able to cause the Admin UI to write the following content into arbitrary .yaml files (including files like email.yaml, system.yaml, or other site YAML files like admin.yaml) — demonstrating arbitrary YAML
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-h756-wh59-hhjv in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-h756-wh59-hhjv across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.