GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c
Fix: sulu/sulu@2b959deGHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c is a CWE-639 vulnerability in sulu/sulu. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Sulu: Media move/update authorization bypass (IDOR)
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c.
Real-World Exposure
sulu/sulu🐘sulu/suluReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
A media move authorization bypass (IDOR) lets a backend user move a media out of a collection they have no access to.
The media move endpoint resolves its permission check from the collection value in the request rather than from the media's real collection. MediaManager::move() then reassigns the media without re-checking its actual source collection. A user who has edit rights on collection A but no rights on a restricted collection B can move a media that lives in B by naming A in the request. The move succeeds, the media ends up in A, and the user can then view and download content they were never allowed to see.
This only affects installations that use per-collection (object level) permissions to restrict some collections. Exploitation requires an authenticated backend user with edit rights on at least one collection, and knowledge of the target media id.
Patches
Fixed in 2.6.25 and 3.0.8. MediaManager::move() now verifies edit permission on the media's real source collection and on the destination collection before moving it.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade immediately:
- Restrict the media edit permission to trusted users, so untrusted users cannot trigger a move.
- Apply the fix manually by adding an edit permission check on the media's real source collection (and the destination) inside
MediaManager::move().
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | sulu/sulu | all versions | 2.6.25 |
| 🐘Packagist | sulu/sulu | ≥ 3.0.0-alpha1&&< 3.0.8 | 3.0.8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for sulu/sulu. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update sulu/sulu to 2.6.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h6cx-gjxx-v25c across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.