Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle Vulnerable to SQL Injection in Translation Grid Date Filter via Unsanitized Property ParameterGHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92

GitHub Security Advisory Draft — GM-369

Summary

SQL injection in Pimcore's translation grid date filter — the user-supplied property field from the filter JSON is interpolated directly into a UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...))) SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation.

Severity

CVSS 3.1: 8.8 (High) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Affected Component

• Package: pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle
• File: src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
• Lines: 565 (input), 569 (inadequate sanitization), 593 (injection point)
• Endpoint: POST /admin/translation/translations

Description

The translation grid endpoint processes JSON filter parameters. When a filter has type: "date", the property field is extracted and used to construct a SQL expression:

$fieldname = $filter[$propertyField];              // Line 565 — user input
$fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);    // Line 569 — trivially bypassable
$fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;        // Line 577
$fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";  // Line 593 — injection

The str_replace('--', '') sanitization is trivially bypassable (use /**/ comments or ----). In non-language mode, $fieldname is concatenated directly into the SQL condition without quoting or parameterization.

Impact

Authenticated user with translations view permission can extract arbitrary database data via UNION-based or error-based SQL injection. Combined with GM-249 (unsafe unserialize), this enables an SQLi → deserialization → RCE chain.

Proof of Concept

POST /admin/translation/translations
filter=[{"property":"1))) UNION SELECT password FROM users WHERE ((1","type":"date","operator":"eq","value":"2026-01-01"}]

Suggested Fix

Validate $fieldname against an allowlist of valid column names before SQL interpolation:

$allowedDateColumns = ['creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
if (!in_array($fieldname, $allowedDateColumns, true)) {
    continue;
}

References

• CWE-89: SQL Injection
• Related: CVE-2026-27461 (RLIKE injection in Dependency/Dao.php — different code path)

Suggested Fix

In TranslationController.php: (1) Add allowlist check for non-language fieldnames before processing. (2) Replace raw string interpolation UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname}))) with $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname) to prevent SQL injection in date filter expressions.

--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
 
                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
                 if (!$languageMode) {
                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
                 }
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
                             $operator = '=';
-                            $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+                            // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
                         }

Proposed Fix

--- a/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
+++ b/src/Controller/Admin/TranslationController.php
@@ -569,7 +569,15 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                 $fieldname = str_replace('--', '', $fieldname);
 
                 if (!$languageMode && in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)
                     || $languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
                     continue;
                 }
 
+                // Allowlist non-language fieldnames to prevent SQL injection
+                $allowedNonLanguageFields = ['key', 'type', 'creationDate', 'modificationDate'];
+                if (!$languageMode && !in_array($fieldname, $allowedNonLanguageFields) && !in_array($fieldname, $validLanguages)) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+
                 if (!$languageMode) {
                     $fieldname = $tableName . '.' . $fieldname;
                 }
@@ -582,7 +590,7 @@ class TranslationController extends AdminAbstractController
                         } elseif ($filter[$operatorField] == 'eq') {
                             $operator = '=';
-                            $fieldname = "UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME({$fieldname})))";
+                            // Use validated fieldname only — never interpolate raw user input into SQL functions
+                            $fieldname = sprintf('UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(%s)))', $db->quoteIdentifier($fieldname));
                         }

Happy to submit this as a PR against a private fork if that is the preferred workflow.