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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx

MEDIUM

GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) CWE-668 vulnerability in github.com/xyproto/algernon. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Algernon: Auto-refresh SSE event server binds to all interfaces by default on Linux/macOS

Also known asCVE-2026-46430GO-2026-5401
Published
May 20, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 16, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs10th percentile — riskier than 10% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.70%0.0%0.2%0.2%0.2%Jun 26Aug 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 360,482 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/xyproto/algernon

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The SSE event server bound to 0.0.0.0:5553 on Linux/macOS by default because the platform-dependent host default in engine/flags.go:39-46 set host = "" for non-Windows, and utils.JoinHostPort("", ":5553") resolves to ":5553" — a Go http.Server.Addr of ":5553" listens on every interface. On Windows the same code chose "localhost", binding loopback only.

The result was a platform split where the OS Algernon's dev workflow is most often used on (Linux/macOS) got the network-exposed default, and only Windows users got the loopback-safe one. A LAN peer with no developer interaction could connect to <dev-laptop-ip>:5553 and read the file-change stream.

This advisory covers the bind-address default in isolation. The fix is independent of authentication (#2a) and CORS (#2b) — switching the default to loopback can be done without touching either.

Details

Root cause — platform-dependent host default in handleFlags

// engine/flags.go:39-46  (1.17.6)
host := ""
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
    host = "localhost"
    // Default Bolt database file
    ac.defaultBoltFilename = filepath.Join(serverTempDir, "algernon.db")
    // Default log file
    ac.defaultLogFile = filepath.Join(serverTempDir, "algernon.log")
}
// engine/config.go:388-391  (1.17.6, finalConfiguration)
if ac.eventAddr == "" {
    ac.eventAddr = utils.JoinHostPort(host, ac.defaultEventColonPort)
}

Result tabulated:

PlatformhosteventAddr after JoinHostPortEffective bind
Linux""":5553"0.0.0.0:5553 (all interfaces)
macOS""":5553"0.0.0.0:5553 (all interfaces)
Windows"localhost""localhost:5553"127.0.0.1:5553 (loopback)

The same host value also governs the main web server bind, so the platform split affects both ports. The web-server bind on Linux/macOS is a separate (defensible) design decision — a server intended to be reachable; the SSE port is not such a service and inherited the same default by accident.

Why this is an independent finding

The fix is a single line: change the default host value, or change the eventAddr default specifically, to "localhost" regardless of platform. No change to authentication or CORS is required to close the network-reach half of the original bundled advisory. A LAN peer can no longer connect — the listener is unreachable from another host — even if the SSE handler still has no authentication and still returns Allow-Origin: *.

PoC (against 1.17.6 on Linux/macOS)

# Operator's laptop on a hotel/cafe/office WiFi:
algernon -a /path/to/project
# => SSE listener bound to 0.0.0.0:5553

# Any peer on the same subnet:
$ curl -sN http://<dev-laptop-ip>:5553/sse
id: 0
data: /path/to/project/secret-notes.md

id: 1
data: /path/to/project/.env.local

No interaction from the developer is required. The peer needs network reach and nothing else.

Impact

  • Confidentiality: medium. LAN-bounded continuous information disclosure of filenames and edit timing.
  • Integrity: none.
  • Availability: none directly.

The CVSS vector uses AV:A (adjacent network) to model the LAN-only reach. The vector for a misconfigured deployment behind a NAT-less or routed network would shift to AV:N and rise to 5.3.

Suggestions to fix

Primary fix — pick localhost as the SSE default on every platform.

// engine/flags.go -- platform-independent default for the event listener
// (keep the existing platform split for the WEB server if desired, but
// not for the event server)
host := "localhost"

Or, more surgically:

// engine/config.go -- finalConfiguration
if ac.eventAddr == "" {
    ac.eventAddr = utils.JoinHostPort("localhost", ac.defaultEventColonPort)
}

An operator who genuinely wants LAN-reachable SSE can pass --eventserver 0.0.0.0:5553 explicitly and accept the consequences.

Stronger fix — eliminate the second listener entirely. Mount the SSE handler on the main mux at /sse. The bind address is then whatever the main server uses; there is no second listener and therefore no second bind-address default to get wrong.

Live verification

Audit-host bind check (Windows 10):

$ netstat -an | findstr 5553
  TCP    127.0.0.1:5553         0.0.0.0:0              LISTENING

Confirms the Windows default is localhost. The Linux/macOS bind to 0.0.0.0:5553 is documented in the code path above; it was not exercised on the audit machine because the audit host was Windows. A maintainer reproducing on a Linux host would see 0.0.0.0:5553 LISTENING from ss -tlnp.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/xyproto/algernonall versions1.17.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/xyproto/algernon. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/xyproto/algernon to 1.17.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The SSE event server bound to `0.0.0.0:5553` on Linux/macOS by default because the platform-dependent host default in `engine/flags.go:39-46` set `host = ""` for non-Windows, and `utils.JoinHostPort("", ":5553")` resolves to `":5553"` — a Go `http.Server.Addr` of `":5553"` listens on every interface. On Windows the same code chose `"localhost"`, binding loopback only. The result was a platform split where the OS Algernon's dev workflow is most often used on (Linux/macOS) got the network-exposed default, and only Windows users got the loopback-safe one. A LAN peer with no develope
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-gj84-924c-48fx in your dependencies?

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