How severe is GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975?

GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 has a CVSS score of 6.3/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975?

GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 affects the following packages: github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975?

Update github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos to 0.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Is GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975?

GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.1%, placing it in the 2th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975?

GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 is classified as CWE-367 (CWE-367). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 was published on November 10, 2026 and was last updated on November 10, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

MEDIUM severity

Cocos AI Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to TOCTOU AttacksGHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975

MEDIUMFix: ultravioletrs/cocos#582

GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.3) CWE-367 vulnerability in github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos. A fix is available for github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-119345

Published

Nov 10, 2026

Updated

Nov 10, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.1%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs2th percentile — riskier than 2% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An attacker who can modify the attested workload’s code, memory-backed state, or configuration after the initial attestation — but without necessarily terminating the existing TLS connection — can cause the peer to continue trusting the connection as if the originally attested state were still running.

Details

Once attestation is successfully appraised and connection is established, there is a window of vulnerability from the establishment of connection to the termination of connection where an attacker can modify the state of the workload and platform at runtime on the TLS endpoint acting as the Attester. Workload state includes code, data, and configuration. Other examples of state changes at the workload level include cases where a new device (such as a GPU) is connected, or where a connected device is disconnected, since the connection establishment.

In Cocos AI, there is no mechanism for the peer to know that some state has changed in the Attester after the connection establishment. The vulnerability is particularly concerning for long-lived connections.

In short, this vulnerability was possible because Cocos AI performs attestation only once in the lifetime of the connection (at connection establishment time) and the verifying peer continues to believe that the state is the same as in initial Evidence throughout, whereas it could be stale at some point in time.

This vulnerability for Cocos AI was found and demonstrated by Muhammad Usama Sardar via formal analysis. Formal analysis was performed in the state-of-the-art tool, ProVerif.

Workarounds

The proposed workaround is to allow re-attestation of the workload after periodic or user-defined intervals using post-handshake attestation.

Background and General Technical Details

For background and general (not specific to Cocos AI) technical details on this vulnerability, please see G-RA2: Freshness of Evidence in Sec. 5.1.1 of Identity Crisis in Confidential Computing: Formal Analysis of Attested TLS. Also, see the corresponding formal analysis.

Credits

This vulnerability for Cocos AI was found and responsibly disclosed by Muhammad Usama Sardar (TU Dresden, Germany).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos`	all versions	0.9.0`go get github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos@v0.9.0`

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/ultravioletrs/cocos to 0.9.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ghwv-vrp2-2975 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An attacker who can modify the attested workload’s code, memory-backed state, or configuration after the initial attestation — but without necessarily terminating the existing TLS connection — can cause the peer to continue trusting the connection as if the originally attested state were still running. ### Details Once attestation is successfully appraised and connection is established, there is a window of vulnerability from the establishment of connection to the termination of connection where an attacker can modify the state of the workload and platform at runtime on the TLS en