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📦 GitHub Actions

GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc

HIGH

Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)

Also known asCVE-2023-52137
Published
Jan 2, 2024
Updated
Jan 2, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
2.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk83th percentile+2.00%
0.00%1.09%2.18%3.26%0.5%2.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
📦tj-actions/verify-changed-files

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The tj-actions/verify-changed-files action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.

Details

The verify-changed-files workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.

This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.

Proof of Concept

  1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example $(whoami).txt would be a valid filename.
  2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the List all changed files tracked and untracked files step.
- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
  run: |
    echo "Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}"

Example output:

##[group]Run echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt"
  echo "Changed files: $(whoami).txt"
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
Changed files: runner.txt

Impact

This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.

Resolution

  • A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.

  • A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.

- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files
  env:
     CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}
  run: |
    echo "Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES"

Resources

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionstj-actions/verify-changed-filesall versions17
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tj-actions/verify-changed-files. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update tj-actions/verify-changed-files to 17 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. ### Details The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc: tj-actions/verify-changed… Remote Code Exe… | O3 Security