GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 — thorsten/phpmyfaq
MEDIUMGHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-73 vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.
phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal in Client::deleteClientFolder enables arbitrary directory deletion by non-super-admin admins
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
thorsten/phpmyfaq🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaqReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Client::deleteClientFolder() in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Instance/Client.php:583 takes a URL from the caller, strips the https:// prefix, and passes the remainder to Filesystem::deleteDirectory() relative to the multisite clientFolder. No path-traversal validation runs. An admin with the INSTANCE_DELETE permission (a role short of SUPER_ADMIN) submits https://../../../<path> as the client URL and the server recursively deletes arbitrary directories under the web user's rights. Same pattern and reachability as GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x, which the project accepted at High severity three weeks earlier.
Details
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Instance/Client.php:583-591:
public function deleteClientFolder(string $sourceUrl): bool
{
if (!$this->isMultiSiteWriteable()) {
return false;
}
$sourcePath = str_replace(search: 'https://', replace: '', subject: $sourceUrl);
return $this->filesystem->deleteDirectory($this->clientFolder . $sourcePath);
}
str_replace strips the scheme but does nothing about ../ segments. The concatenation $this->clientFolder . $sourcePath directly feeds the filesystem call, which traverses above clientFolder without complaint.
Callers feed the URL from the HTTP request body:
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/InstanceController.php:184:
if (1 !== $instanceId && $client->deleteClientFolder($clientData->url) && $client->delete($instanceId)) {
$clientData->url comes from json_decode($request->getContent()). The route is admin.api.instance.delete, gated by INSTANCE_DELETE. The controller does not validate the URL against a scheme list or canonicalize the path before handing it to deleteClientFolder().
InstanceController.php:144 (edit path) and Controller/Administration/InstanceController.php:151 (form path) both reach the same sink through different entry points.
Precedent
GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x (2026-03-31) disclosed the identical bug class in MediaBrowserController::index(): an admin-gated API endpoint concatenates a user-supplied filename to a base directory without traversal validation. phpMyFAQ accepted that report at High severity. The present finding is the same root cause in a different controller; the project's INSTANCE_ADD / INSTANCE_DELETE permission is a granular admin right, not SUPER_ADMIN, so a lower-tier admin can reach the sink.
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites: a phpMyFAQ 4.2.x instance with the multisite subsystem bootstrapped (there must be a non-primary instance present for the delete controller branch to fire). Alice is an admin with INSTANCE_ADD and INSTANCE_DELETE rights, no SUPER_ADMIN flag.
Step 1: Alice authenticates and retrieves the CSRF token for the instance admin page.
Step 2: Alice creates an instance whose url encodes a traversal payload. The create path at InstanceController.php:144 already concatenates to the clientFolder through the same deleteClientFolder('https://' . $hostname) call:
curl -sS -b "$ALICE_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/admin/api/instance" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "x-csrf-token: $CSRF" \
-d '{"url":"https://../../../tmp/pmf-poc/","instance":"poc","comment":"poc","email":"a@b","admin":"alice","password":"poc1234!"}'
Step 3: Alice deletes the instance. The request body names the instance id to delete; the controller hands clientData->url directly to deleteClientFolder:
curl -sS -b "$ALICE_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/admin/api/instance/2" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "x-csrf-token: $CSRF" \
-d '{"url":"https://../../../tmp/pmf-poc/"}'
The server computes $sourcePath = '../../../tmp/pmf-poc/', concatenates to <clientFolder>/, and recursively deletes the resulting path.
Live verification was not attempted against the test instance because the INSTANCE_DELETE path requires the multisite/ subsystem to be bootstrapped with at least one non-primary instance; see InstanceController.php:184. The code path is unambiguous and the precedent GHSA confirmed the same admin gating was considered in-scope.
Impact
Any phpMyFAQ admin holding INSTANCE_ADD + INSTANCE_DELETE but not SUPER_ADMIN can delete arbitrary directories writable by the PHP process. Outcomes:
- Destroy other tenants' data on a shared multisite deployment by traversing above the
clientFolderinto peer directories. - Delete phpMyFAQ's own
content/,config/, or cache directories and lock the install out. - On a hosted deployment, overwrite or delete files anywhere under the web user's reach, including customer uploads outside phpMyFAQ.
phpMyFAQ's permission model gives INSTANCE_ADD / INSTANCE_DELETE as a role that a hosting operator may delegate to a subordinate admin without granting SUPER_ADMIN. That delegation is now a direct path-traversal-delete primitive.
Recommended Fix
Canonicalize and validate the URL before forming the filesystem path.
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Instance/Client.php:583:
public function deleteClientFolder(string $sourceUrl): bool
{
if (!$this->isMultiSiteWriteable()) {
return false;
}
$parsed = parse_url($sourceUrl);
if (!is_array($parsed) || !isset($parsed['host']) || ($parsed['scheme'] ?? '') !== 'https') {
return false;
}
$host = $parsed['host'];
if (!preg_match('/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]*$/i', $host)) {
return false;
}
$target = realpath($this->clientFolder . $host);
$root = realpath($this->clientFolder);
if ($target === false || $root === false || !str_starts_with($target, $root . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) {
return false;
}
return $this->filesystem->deleteDirectory($target);
}
parse_url rejects malformed inputs, the regex pins the host to valid DNS characters (no /, no ..), and the realpath check ensures the resolved target lives under clientFolder. Apply the same canonicalization at the controller layer (InstanceController::add, ::update, ::delete) so the URL is validated before every call that touches the filesystem.
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.2composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.2composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.