Open WebUI: /api/v1/channels/{id}/members exposes full user model including sensitive credentialsGHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m
Fix: open-webui/open-webui@fbcdcf1GHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m is a Information Exposure vulnerability in open-webui. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
open-webuiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The channel members endpoint serializes and returns full user models for channel participants, including settings objects. A normal user in a DM can retrieve admin-only sensitive configuration such as webhook URLs and tool server key material (settings.ui.toolServers[].key), which is not available via standard user info APIs.
Details
The endpoint GET /api/v1/channels/{id}/members returns the full serialized user model for every member in the channel. In both the DM and non-DM code paths, the handler constructs the response with [UserModelResponse(**user.model_dump(), is_active=...)] and returns it as the users list. Because UserModel (models/users.py) includes a settings object (UserSettings) and arbitrary UI configuration (settings.ui), the endpoint exposes other users' sensitive configuration to any channel participant.
Practically, a regular user who participates in a DM or group can call /api/v1/channels/{id}/members and receive other members' settings, including admin-only details such as webhook notification URLs and tool server configuration, including credential fields like settings.ui.toolServers[].key. These values are not returned by the normal user profile endpoints (e.g., /api/v1/users/{user_id}/info).
PoC
- Start a local Open WebUI instance
- Log in as admin and in the Admin Panel, go to Settings -> General and check Channels (Beta), then press Save.
- Create a low-privilege user in the Users tab
- Click on the admin's profile bottom left, Settings and Integrations. Then click the
+after Manage Tool Servers to add some tool server with a secret Bearer token (eg.KEY) - Log in as the attacker with the low-privilege account and create a new Direct Message channel with the admin user:
- After creating, open DevTools with F12 and go to the Network tab. Then in the DM UI click on the Users icon top right to see the members. In the network tab, this should have triggered a
/api/v1/channels/{id}/membersrequest which responds with thesettingskey includingtoolServersandkeyvalues:
The attacker has now leaked the admin's bearer token for the toolserver they configured.
Impact
Conditions for exploit: channels are enabled and an attacker has a low-privilege account.
Webhook URLs and tool server configurations (including bearer keys) can be exfiltrated from any user.
Original Agent Report
<img width="400" alt="app aikido dev_ai-pentests_projects_116389_assessments_019d67d4-81c8-7dd2-bb9e-0a4a774b2c78_issues_sidebarIssue=20440423 (4)" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8415553a-9f1e-4f73-929c-aa0d18a101ca" />Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | ≥ 0.7.0&&< 0.10.0 | 0.10.0pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.10.0' |
Affected Products
open webuiopenwebuiDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.10.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-gh7p-78x6-jw6m in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.