GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg
HIGHOneUptime ClickHouse vulnerable to SQL Injection via unvalidated column identifiers in sort, select, and groupBy parameters
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
oneuptimenpmDescription
The fix for GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35 (ClickHouse SQL injection via aggregate query parameters) added column name validation to the _aggregateBy method but did not apply the same validation to three other query construction paths in StatementGenerator. The toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, and toGroupByStatement methods accept user-controlled object keys from API request bodies and interpolate them as ClickHouse Identifier parameters without verifying they correspond to actual model columns.
ClickHouse Identifier parameters are substituted directly into queries without escaping, so an attacker who can reach any analytics list or aggregate endpoint can inject arbitrary SQL through crafted sort, select, or groupBy keys.
Details
Root cause
StatementGenerator.ts has four methods that iterate over user-provided object keys to build SQL:
| Method | Validates keys? |
|---|---|
toWhereStatement (line 292) | Yes - calls this.model.getTableColumn(key) |
toSortStatement (line 467) | No |
toSelectStatement (line 483) | No |
toGroupByStatement (line 451) | No |
In Statement.ts, when a value passed to the SQL tagged template is a string, it receives the Identifier data type (line 40). Per ClickHouse documentation, Identifier parameters are substituted directly into the query without quoting or escaping. This is correct for trusted column names but unsafe for user input.
Input flow
BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts deserializes sort, select, and groupBy directly from req.body (lines 239-253) and passes them to the service layer without column validation:
sort = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["sort"]) as Sort<AnalyticsDataModel>;
select = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["select"]) as Select<AnalyticsDataModel>;
groupBy = JSONFunctions.deserialize(req.body["groupBy"]) as GroupBy<AnalyticsDataModel>;
Affected endpoints
Any endpoint backed by BaseAnalyticsAPI.getList() or BaseAnalyticsAPI.getAggregate() - this includes analytics queries for logs, metrics, spans, and exceptions.
Impact
An authenticated user can inject arbitrary ClickHouse SQL through crafted column names in sort, select, or groupBy request parameters. This allows reading, modifying, or deleting analytics data (logs, metrics, traces) stored in ClickHouse. PostgreSQL data is not affected (separate query path).
Suggested Fix
Add the same getTableColumn() validation already present in toWhereStatement to the three unvalidated methods:
// toSortStatement, toSelectStatement, toGroupByStatement
for (const key in sort) {
if (!this.model.getTableColumn(key)) {
throw new BadDataException(`Unknown column: ${key}`);
}
// existing logic
}
This matches the pattern used in the GHSA-p5g2 fix for _aggregateBy and the existing toWhereStatement validation.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | oneuptime | all versions | 10.0.34 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for oneuptime. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update oneuptime to 10.0.34 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-gcg3-c5p2-cqgg across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.