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Maven

GHSA-g762-h86w-8749

MEDIUM

BoringSSLAEADContext in Netty Repeats Nonces

Also known asCVE-2024-36121
Published
Jun 5, 2024
Updated
Jun 5, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk18th percentile-0.14%
0.00%0.30%0.60%0.90%0.4%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat.

Details

  1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2).
  2. The sequence number (seq) is stored as 32-bit int which is relatively easy to overflow.

https://github.com/netty/netty-incubator-codec-ohttp/blob/1ddadb6473cd3be5491d114431ed4c1a9f316001/codec-ohttp-hpke-classes-boringssl/src/main/java/io/netty/incubator/codec/hpke/boringssl/BoringSSLAEADContext.java#L112-L114

Impact

If the BoringSSLAEADContext is used to encrypt more than 2^32 messages then the AES-GCM nonce will repeat. Repeating a nonce with AES-GCM results in both confidentiality and integrity compromise of data encrypted with the associated key.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp0.0.3.Final&&< 0.0.11.Final0.0.11.Final
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty.incubator:netty-incubator-codec-ohttp to 0.0.11.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g762-h86w-8749 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g762-h86w-8749 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-g762-h86w-8749. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary BoringSSLAEADContext keeps track of how many OHTTP responses have been sent and uses this sequence number to calculate the appropriate nonce to use with the encryption algorithm. Unfortunately, two separate errors combine which would allow an attacker to cause the sequence number to overflow and thus the nonce to repeat. ### Details 1. There is no overflow detection or enforcement of the maximum sequence value. (This is a missed requirement from the draft Chunked Oblivious OHTTP RFC and so should be inherited from the HPKE RFC 9180, Section 5.2). 2. The sequence number (seq) is s
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-g762-h86w-8749 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-g762-h86w-8749 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.