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GHSA-g6xq-892h-64w3

MEDIUM

Composer: URL-embedded HTTP-Basic username leaks to verbose logs (GitHub PAT exposure)

Also known asBIT-composer-2026-59947CVE-2026-59947
Published
Jul 20, 2026
Updated
Jul 20, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐘composer/composer🐘composer/composer

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When Composer is run with -vvv (debug verbosity), it could print a credential that was embedded directly in a repository or package URL, but not as a password, to its debug output. Composer already masked the password portion of such URLs, but the username portion was shown in clear text. Because GitHub and several other services support placing an access token in the username position of a URL (for example https://[token]@github.com/owner/repo), a token used that way could end up written to the verbose log in full.

This is an information disclosure issue. The credential is only ever exposed to whoever can already read Composer's debug output.

Am I affected?

You are potentially affected only if all of the following apply:

  • A credential is embedded inside a URL that Composer handles, e.g. in a repositories entry in composer.json, in a package dist/source URL - rather than being supplied through auth.json or the COMPOSER_AUTH environment variable.
  • The secret sits in the username slot of that URL (e.g. https://TOKEN@host/…). A normal username:password@host pair where the username is an ordinary account name did not expose the password, that was already masked.
  • Composer is run with -vvv (debug verbosity), and that output is retained or shared somewhere others can read it: public CI build logs, output pasted into an issue or chat, archived terminal sessions, and so on.

If you keep credentials in auth.json or environment variables, or you never run Composer at debug verbosity, you were not exposed.

The most realistic exposure is the documented pattern of embedding a GitHub Personal Access Token in a URL's username position on a machine (often CI) that captures verbose output.

Patched versions

The username is now masked the same way the password already was, so an embedded token no longer appears in verbose output (a short, non-secret prefix may be shown to aid debugging, but never the full value).

Fixed in Composer 2.10.2 and the 2.2.29.

Workarounds

There is no configuration setting that prevents outputting credentials while keeping normal behavior.

If you cannot upgrade right away, you can reduce exposure by:

  • Not running Composer with -vvv (debug verbosity) in environments where output is captured or shared.
  • Moving credentials out of URLs and into auth.json or COMPOSER_AUTH.
  • Scrubbing existing CI/build logs that may already contain a leaked token.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistcomposer/composer2.3.0&&< 2.10.22.10.2
🐘Packagistcomposer/composer1.0.0&&< 2.2.292.2.29

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for composer/composer. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update composer/composer to 2.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g6xq-892h-64w3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g6xq-892h-64w3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-g6xq-892h-64w3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary When Composer is run with -vvv (debug verbosity), it could print a credential that was embedded directly in a repository or package URL, but not as a password, to its debug output. Composer already masked the password portion of such URLs, but the username portion was shown in clear text. Because GitHub and several other services support placing an access token in the username position of a URL (for example https://[token]@github.com/owner/repo), a token used that way could end up written to the verbose log in full. This is an information disclosure issue. The credential is only e
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-g6xq-892h-64w3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-g6xq-892h-64w3 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.