PraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server GenerationGHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg
CRITICALGHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) Code Injection vulnerability in praisonai. A fix is available for praisonai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
praisonaiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The deploy/api.py module generates Python server code by directly interpolating the agents_file parameter into an f-string that is then written to a file and executed via subprocess.Popen(). An attacker who controls the agents_file value (via CLI argument, configuration, or upstream API) can inject arbitrary Python code.
Details
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy/api.py (line 80):
code = f'''...
praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")
...
"agent_file": "{agents_file}"
...'''
The generated code is then executed (line 190):
subprocess.Popen(['python', server_file])
agents_file is never sanitized or validated. A malicious value breaks out of the string context:
agents_file = '"); import os; os.system("id"); #'
# Generated code becomes:
# praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=""); import os; os.system("id"); #")
The same pattern exists in deploy/docker.py (line 33) for Dockerfile generation.
PoC
# The injection:
agents_file = '"); import os; os.system("id"); #'
# What the generated code looks like:
template = f'praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file="{agents_file}")'
print(template)
# Output: praisonai = PraisonAI(agent_file=""); import os; os.system("id"); #")
Impact
- Arbitrary code execution on the machine running the deploy command
- Supply chain risk if
agents_filecomes from a configuration file or CI/CD pipeline
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | praisonai | all versions | 4.6.78pip install --upgrade 'praisonai==4.6.78' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update praisonai to 4.6.78 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-g6j7-pffp-8whg in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.