accounts: Hash account number using SaltGHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7
GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 is a security vulnerability in github.com/moov-io/customers. A fix is available for github.com/moov-io/customers — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/moov-io/customersReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
@alovak found that currently when we build hash of account number we do not "salt" it. Which makes it vulnerable to rainbow table attack.
What did you expect to see? I expected salt (some random number from configuration) to be used in hash.AccountNumber
I would generate salt per tenant at least (maybe per organization).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/moov-io/customers | all versions | 0.5.0go get github.com/moov-io/customers@v0.5.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/moov-io/customers, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/moov-io/customers to 0.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.