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accounts: Hash account number using SaltGHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7

GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 is a security vulnerability in github.com/moov-io/customers. A fix is available for github.com/moov-io/customers — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of May 21, 2021 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/moov-io/customers

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

@alovak found that currently when we build hash of account number we do not "salt" it. Which makes it vulnerable to rainbow table attack.

What did you expect to see? I expected salt (some random number from configuration) to be used in hash.AccountNumber

I would generate salt per tenant at least (maybe per organization).

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/moov-io/customersall versions0.5.0go get github.com/moov-io/customers@v0.5.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/moov-io/customers, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/moov-io/customers to 0.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g636-q5fc-4pr7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

@alovak found that currently when we build hash of account number we do not "salt" it. Which makes it vulnerable to rainbow table attack. **What did you expect to see?** I expected salt (some random number from configuration) to be used in [hash.AccountNumber](https://github.com/moov-io/customers/blob/master/pkg/secrets/hash/account_number.go#L13) I would generate salt per tenant at least (maybe per organization).
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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accounts: Hash account number using Salt