xmldom PI grammar regex ReDoS: quadratic backtracking on unterminated processing instructionsGHSA-g53g-w8rj-fmg7
Fix: xmldom/xmldom#1039GHSA-g53g-w8rj-fmg7 is a Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in @xmldom/xmldom. A fix is available for @xmldom/xmldom — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-g53g-w8rj-fmg7.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@xmldom/xmldomnpmDescription
Summary
@xmldom/xmldom's processing-instruction (PI) grammar regex exhibits quadratic-time backtracking
(ReDoS) when parsing an unterminated processing instruction. A single small XML document
containing <? + a target + a long run of whitespace and no closing ?> forces the regular
expression engine into O(n²) work, stalling the Node.js event loop. The input is parsed with
DOMParser.parseFromString under default options, so it is reachable from unauthenticated,
network-delivered XML (SOAP/SAML, webhooks, uploads, XML APIs).
Details
The PI production in lib/grammar.js compiles (flags mu) to:
^<\?(NameChars)(?:[\x20\x09\x0D\x0A]+([Char]*?))?\?>
^^^ S+ greedy ^^^ Char*? lazy
lib/grammar.jsline 261: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/grammar.js#L261
In the optional tail (?:S+(Char*?))?, both the greedy separator S+ and the lazy data Char*?
match XML whitespace. When the required trailing ?> is absent, the engine must ultimately fail —
but first it tries every partition of the whitespace run between S+ and Char*?, which is O(n²)
in the length of the trailing whitespace.
The regex is executed against the entire remaining source string in two places in lib/sax.js,
so the whole whitespace tail is scanned:
parsePI— https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L680-L691parseProcessingInstruction— https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L862-L879
Affected Versions
Only the 0.9.x line is affected. lib/grammar.js (and this PI regex) was introduced in
commit 726b471 ("fix!: preserve DOCTYPE internal subset (#498)"), first released in
0.9.0-beta.9, and is unchanged through 0.9.10.
The 0.8.x line (≤ 0.8.13) and the unscoped xmldom package (≤ 0.6.0) parse PIs via a different
code path bounded by indexOf('?>') — they do not contain this regex and are not affected
by this issue. (They were not separately tested for a different PI ReDoS; the scope here is the
specific grammar.js regex.)
| Line | PI code path | Affected? |
|---|---|---|
0.9.x (0.9.0-beta.9 … 0.9.10) | grammar.js PI regex over full remaining source | Yes |
0.8.x (≤ 0.8.13) | parseInstruction, bounded by indexOf('?>') | No |
unscoped xmldom (≤ 0.6.0) | older indexOf('?>')-bounded parsing | No |
Proof of Concept
const { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
const n = 32 * 1024;
const payload = '<a><?p' + ' '.repeat(n); // unterminated PI, no `?>`
console.time('parse');
new DOMParser().parseFromString(payload, 'text/xml');
console.timeEnd('parse');
Measured (Node 18), trailing whitespace after <?p, no ?> — time quadruples per doubling of
input length (canonical O(n²)):
| Trailing whitespace | g.PI.exec | parseFromString |
|---|---|---|
| 2 KB | 4.4 ms | 5.1 ms |
| 4 KB | 16.9 ms | 17.0 ms |
| 8 KB | 111.4 ms | 66.3 ms |
| 16 KB | 263.8 ms | 336.5 ms |
| 32 KB | 1073.1 ms | — |
Impact
Availability only: a single parse of a small crafted document blocks the Node.js event loop for the duration of the quadratic scan (≈1 s at 32 KB; multi-second with larger inputs). No memory blow-up, no data exposure, no integrity impact. Because XML is routinely accepted from untrusted sources and parsed with default options, one request can stall a server.
Fix Applied
Fixed in @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.11 (0.9.x-only; the 0.8.x LTS line and the
unscoped xmldom package use a different, bounded PI code path and are not affected).
PR #1039 inserts a fixed-width negative lookahead
(?!\s) immediately after the greedy S+, so the separator can no longer hand whitespace back to
the lazy data group:
- var PI = reg(/^<\?/, '(', Name, ')', regg(S, '(', Char, '*?)'), '?', /\?>/);
+ var PI = reg(/^<\?/, '(', Name, ')', regg(S, '(?!', _SChar, ')(', Char, '*?)'), '?', /\?>/);
The change is correct, minimal, and behavior-preserving: it produces identical [target, data]
captures on all valid PIs tested (incl. whitespace-heavy, tab/newline, empty-data, and xml-decl
cases) and removes the backtracking blow-up (linear, ~0.4 ms at 128 KB after the fix). The lookahead
is fixed-width and cannot itself backtrack — a strict improvement with no new parsing risk.
Severity note
The complexity is quadratic, not exponential, so a multi-second stall requires
tens-to-hundreds of KB of input. VA:H reflects that xmldom applies no input-size limit and the
path runs on default-options parsing, so a single unbounded parse can fully stall the event loop.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @xmldom/xmldom | ≥ 0.9.0-beta.9&&< 0.9.11 | 0.9.11npm install @xmldom/xmldom@0.9.11 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @xmldom/xmldom, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @xmldom/xmldom to 0.9.11 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g53g-w8rj-fmg7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
Important: A Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) flaw in the xmldom library allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service. By sending specially crafted XML input, an attacker can trigger quadratic backtracking, leading to the Node.js event loop stalling in applications utilizing…
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-g53g-w8rj-fmg7 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
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