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GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm soroban-poseidon

Fix: stellar/rs-soroban-poseidon#10

GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm is a CWE-328 vulnerability in soroban-poseidon. A fix is available for soroban-poseidon — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Poseidon V1 variable-length input collision via implicit zero-padding

Also known asCVE-2026-32129
Published
Mar 13, 2026
Updated
Mar 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 18, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs13th percentile — riskier than 13% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🦀soroban-poseidon

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Poseidon V1 (PoseidonSponge) accepts variable-length inputs without injective padding. When a caller provides fewer inputs than the sponge rate (inputs.len() < T - 1), unused rate positions are implicitly zero-filled. This allows trivial hash collisions: for any input vector [m1, ..., mk] hashed with a sponge of rate > k, hash([m1, ..., mk]) equals hash([m1, ..., mk, 0]) because both produce identical pre-permutation states.

This affects any use of PoseidonSponge or poseidon_hash where the number of inputs is less than T - 1 (e.g., hashing 1 input with T=3).

Poseidon2 (Poseidon2Sponge) is not affected — it encodes the input length in the capacity element (IV = input_len << 64), making different-length inputs produce distinct states.

Patches

Fixed by enforcing inputs.len() == RATE in PoseidonSponge::compute_hash, matching circom's invariant that nInputs always equals T - 1. Users should upgrade to the next release containing this fix.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

  • Ensure callers always use T = inputs.len() + 1 (full-rate), which is how circom uses Poseidon. For example, to hash 2 inputs, use T=3; to hash 1 input, use T=2. Never use a sponge with more rate capacity than the number of inputs.
  • Alternatively, migrate to Poseidon2Sponge, which is safe for variable-length inputs due to its length-encoding IV.

References

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🦀crates.iosoroban-poseidonall versions25.0.1cargo update -p soroban-poseidon --precise 25.0.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for soroban-poseidon, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update soroban-poseidon to 25.0.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact Poseidon V1 (`PoseidonSponge`) accepts variable-length inputs without injective padding. When a caller provides fewer inputs than the sponge rate (`inputs.len() < T - 1`), unused rate positions are implicitly zero-filled. This allows trivial hash collisions: for any input vector `[m1, ..., mk]` hashed with a sponge of rate > k, `hash([m1, ..., mk])` equals `hash([m1, ..., mk, 0])` because both produce identical pre-permutation states. This affects any use of `PoseidonSponge` or `poseidon_hash` where the number of inputs is less than `T - 1` (e.g., hashing 1 input with `T=3`). Pose
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm across crates.io dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-g2p6-hh5v-7hfm: soroban-poseidon | O3 Security