GHSA-frj9-9rwc-pw9j
Craft Commerce has Stored DOM XSS in Order Status Name (Reflects in "Recent Orders" Dashboard Widget)
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
craftcms/commerce🐘craftcms/commerceReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A stored DOM XSS vulnerability exists in the "Recent Orders" dashboard widget. The Order Status Name is rendered via JavaScript string concatenation without proper escaping, allowing script execution when any admin visits the dashboard.
Users are recommended to update to the patched 5.5.2 release to mitigate the issue.
Proof of Concept
Required Permissions
- Admin access (to edit/create Order Statuses)
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in with an admin account
- Navigate to Commerce → Settings → Order Statuses
- Create new order status (e.g., "Pending")
- Set the Name field to:
<img src=x onerror="alert('Order Statuses XSS')" hidden>
- Save the order status
- Go to Commerce Orders & make some orders with different statuses (e.g. "New" & "the malicious created status")
- Go to the Dashboard (
/admin/dashboard) & Add "Recent Orders" widget and pick the same 2 statuses for orders - Notice the XSS execution <img width="1491" height="568" alt="xss-execution-in-dashboard" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/84e8b121-30b9-4029-93be-e90009b6897e" />
Technical Details
File: vendor/craftcms/commerce/src/templates/_components/widgets/orders/recent/body.twig
Root Cause: value.name (the Order Status Name) is concatenated directly into the HTML string without sanitization. When JavaScript inserts this HTML into the DOM, any malicious tags/scripts in the name are executed.<img width="1780" height="858" alt="vulnerable-code" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b150ee9d-c072-4987-b506-81a29c23d84b" />
Mitigation
Use Craft.escapeHtml() in the callback:
callback: function(value) {
return '<span class="commerceStatusLabel"><span class="status ' + Craft.escapeHtml(value.color) + '"></span>' + Craft.escapeHtml(value.name) + '</span>';
}
Resources:
https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/commit/d94d1c9832a47a1c383e375ae87c46c13935ba65
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | craftcms/commerce | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.5.2 | 5.5.2 |
| 🐘Packagist | craftcms/commerce | ≥ 4.0.0-RC1&&< 4.10.1 | 4.10.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for craftcms/commerce. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update craftcms/commerce to 5.5.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-frj9-9rwc-pw9j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-frj9-9rwc-pw9j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-frj9-9rwc-pw9j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-frj9-9rwc-pw9j in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-frj9-9rwc-pw9j across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.