GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm is a high-severity (CVSS 8.6) Improper Authentication vulnerability in org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2. A fix is available for org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to Olm/Megolm protocol confusion
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
An attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield.
Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. matrix-android-sdk2 would then additionally sign such a key backup with its device key, spilling trust over to other devices trusting the matrix-android-sdk2 device.
These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm.
Patches
matrix-android-sdk2 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages and to stop signing backups on a successful decryption.
Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added:
- Cleartext
m.room_key,m.forwarded_room_keyandm.secret.sendto_device messages are discarded. - Secrets received from untrusted devices are discarded.
- Key backups are only usable if they have a valid signature from a trusted device (no more local trust, or trust-on-decrypt).
- The origin of a to-device message should only be determined by observing the Olm session which managed to decrypt the message, and not by using claimed sender_key, user_id, or any other fields controllable by the homeserver.
Workarounds
As this attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, if you trust your home server no particular workaround is needed. Notice that the backup spoofing attack is a particularly sophisticated targeted attack.
We are not aware of this attack being used in the wild, though specifying a false positive-free way of noticing malicious key backups key is challenging.
As an abundance of caution, to avoid malicious backup attacks, you should not verify your new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched. Prefer using verify with passphrase.
References
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at [email protected].
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2 | all versions | 1.5.1org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2:1.5.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2 to 1.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-fpgf-pjjv-2qgm across Maven dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.