How severe is GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7?

GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 has a CVSS score of 5.3/10, rated MEDIUM. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7?

GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 affects the following packages: ha-mcp (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7?

Update ha-mcp to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ha-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7?

GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 19th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7?

GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 is classified as Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 was published on March 12, 2026 and was last updated on March 14, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7

MEDIUM

ha-mcp OAuth 2.1 DCR mode enables network reconnaissance via an error oracle

Also known asCVE-2026-32111

Published

Mar 12, 2026

Updated

Mar 14, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk19th percentile+0.24%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍ha-mcp

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied ha_url and makes a server-side HTTP request to {ha_url}/api/config with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive.

The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN) is not affected.

Details

Code path 1 — Consent form validation (reported)

When a user submits the OAuth consent form, _validate_ha_credentials() (provider.py) makes a server-side GET request to {ha_url}/api/config with no scheme, IP, or domain validation. Different exception types produce distinct error messages, creating an error oracle:

Outcome	Message returned	Information leaked
`ConnectError`	"Could not connect..."	Host down or port closed
`TimeoutException`	"Connection timed out..."	Host up, port filtered
HTTP 401	"Invalid access token..."	Service alive, requires auth
HTTP 403	"Access forbidden..."	Service alive, forbidden
HTTP ≥ 400	"Failed to connect: HTTP {N}"	Service alive, exact status

An attacker can drive the flow programmatically: register a client via open DCR (POST /register), initiate authorization, extract a txn_id, and submit arbitrary ha_url values. No user interaction required.

Code path 2 — REST tool calls with forged token

OAuth access tokens are stateless base64-encoded JSON payloads ({"ha_url": "...", "ha_token": "..."}). Since tokens are not signed, an attacker can forge a token with an arbitrary ha_url. REST tool calls then make HTTP requests to hardcoded HA API paths on that host (/config, /states, /services, etc.). JSON responses are returned to the caller.

In practice, path control is limited — most endpoints use absolute paths that ignore the ha_url path component. Useful exfiltration requires the target to return JSON at HA API paths, which is unlikely for non-HA services.

Code path 3 — WebSocket tool calls with forged token

The same forged token triggers WebSocket connections to ws://{ha_url}/api/websocket. The client follows the HA WebSocket handshake protocol (waits for auth_required, sends auth, expects auth_ok). Non-HA targets fail at the protocol level and return nothing useful. Realistic exploitation is limited to pivoting to another HA instance on the internal network.

Impact

Confirmed: Internal network reconnaissance via error oracle (all 3 code paths). An attacker can map reachable hosts and open ports from the server's network position.

Scope

OAuth mode is a beta feature, documented separately in docs/OAUTH.md and not part of the main setup instructions. The standard deployment method (pre-configured HOMEASSISTANT_URL and HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN) is not affected.

Fix

Upgrade to 7.0.0

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`ha-mcp`	all versions	7.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ha-mcp. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update ha-mcp to 7.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The ha-mcp OAuth consent form (beta feature) accepts a user-supplied `ha_url` and makes a server-side HTTP request to `{ha_url}/api/config` with no URL validation. An unauthenticated attacker can submit arbitrary URLs to perform internal network reconnaissance via an error oracle. Two additional code paths in OAuth tool calls (REST and WebSocket) are affected by the same primitive. The primary deployment method (private URL with pre-configured `HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN`) is not affected. ### Details **Code path 1 — Consent form validation** (reported) When a user submits the OAuth

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fmfg-9g7c-3vq7 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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