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GHSA-fm3m-jrgm-5ppg

RatPanel can perform remote command execution without authorization

Also known asCVE-2025-53534GO-2025-3844
Published
Aug 4, 2025
Updated
Aug 11, 2025
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk44th percentile-1.70%
0.00%0.96%1.92%2.88%0.4%0.6%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/tnborg/panel🐹github.com/tnborg/panel

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

  • When an attacker obtains the backend login path of RatPanel (including but not limited to weak default paths, brute-force cracking, etc.), they can execute system commands or take over hosts managed by the panel without logging in.
  • In addition to this remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, the flawed code also leads to unauthorized access.

Details

In Go, r.URL.Path retrieves the part of the URL that comes after the port and before the query parameters or anchor symbols. For example, in the URL http://localhost:8080/api/ws/ssh?id=1, the retrieved path would be /api/ws/ssh.

However, if the request is made to http://localhost:8080//api/ws/ssh?id=1, the parsed r.URL.Path would be //api/ws/ssh.

RatPanel uses the CleanPath middleware provided by github.com/go-chi/chi package to clean URLs, The route path inside the chi router will be cleaned to /api/ws/ssh, but this middleware does not process r.URL.Path, so the path is still //api/ws/ssh.

image

In the must_login middleware, RatPanel uses r.URL.Path to match the hard-coded prefix whitelist, because /api/ws does not match //api/ws. The must_login middleware will allow the request, but //api/ws has been cleaned to /api/ws in the chi router. This inconsistency leads to authentication bypass and accessing the dangerous interfaces such as /api/ws/exec and /api/ws/ssh.

image-20250706193354738

But there are some limitations. Before exploiting this interface, the attacker must first identify the correct backend address of ratpanel to activate session legitimacy—specifically, to ensure sess.Put("verify_entrance", true). That said, accessing /api/ws only requires activating the session and does not require completing further authentication or login steps. Therefore, this is assessed to be a remotely exploitable command execution vulnerability with moderate severity.

PoC

I first carried session=......, accessed the backend login page normally (without completing the authentication process), activated the session, and then used the _wsdump.py script provided by the Python websocket-client library to complete the authentication and exploit the vulnerability.

image-20250706202209133 image-20250706202330056 image-20250706202450433

Because of the authorization code

// internal/http/middleware/must_login.go
if slices.Contains(whiteList, r.URL.Path) || !strings.HasPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/api") {
    next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
    return
}

This vulnerability affects the authorization mechanism across all APIs, for example

image-20250706204411739 image-20250706204429581

This authentication vulnerability appears to affect versions v2.3.19 to v2.5.5.


Data packet

GET //api/...... HTTP/2
Host: IP:PORT
Cookie: session=XXXXXX
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
Connection: close


python _wsdump.py wss://ip:port//api/ws/exec --headers "Cookie: session=xxxxxx" -n

Impact

Users running Ratpanel versions v2.3.19 to v2.5.5—especially those who have exposed their admin panel login URL or use weak login URL paths—are vulnerable to unauthorized access. Additionally, versions v2.5.1 to v2.5.5 are susceptible to server and hosted machine takeover.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/tnborg/panel2.3.19&&< 2.5.62.5.6
🐹Gogithub.com/tnborg/panel0.0.0-20241111062800-91ecd04c2700&&< 0.0.0-20250707071915-4985eb2e1f380.0.0-20250707071915-4985eb2e1f38

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/tnborg/panel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/tnborg/panel to 2.5.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fm3m-jrgm-5ppg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fm3m-jrgm-5ppg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fm3m-jrgm-5ppg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary * When an attacker obtains the backend login path of RatPanel (including but not limited to weak default paths, brute-force cracking, etc.), they can execute system commands or take over hosts managed by the panel **without logging in**. * In addition to this **remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability**, the flawed code also leads to **unauthorized access**. ### Details In Go, `r.URL.Path` retrieves the part of the URL that comes after the port and before the query parameters or anchor symbols. For example, in the URL `http://localhost:8080/api/ws/ssh?id=1`, the retrieved path
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fm3m-jrgm-5ppg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-fm3m-jrgm-5ppg across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.