GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc — wwbn/avideo
Fix: WWBN/AVideo@0215d3cGHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is a SQL Injection vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. A fix is available for wwbn/avideo — see the affected versions and patch details below.
AVideo has SQL Injection via Partial Prepared Statement — videos_id Concatenated Directly into Query
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
In objects/like.php, the getLike() method constructs a SQL query using a prepared statement placeholder (?) for users_id but directly concatenates $this->videos_id into the query string without parameterization. An attacker who can control the videos_id value (via a crafted request) can inject arbitrary SQL, bypassing the partial prepared-statement protection.
Details
File: objects/like.php
Vulnerable code:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = ? AND videos_id = ".$this->videos_id." LIMIT 1;";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "i", [$this->users_id]);
The query mixes a parameterized placeholder for users_id with raw string concatenation for videos_id. The $this->videos_id value originates from user-supplied request input (typically a POST/GET parameter identifying the video being liked/disliked) and is not cast to integer or validated before being embedded in the SQL string.
All other queries in the same file correctly use ? placeholders for both columns:
// Correct pattern used elsewhere:
$sql = "SELECT count(*) as total FROM likes WHERE videos_id = ? AND like = 1";
The inconsistency means any attacker who can submit a like/dislike action with a crafted videos_id can inject SQL. Since like/dislike actions are typically available to any authenticated user, the attack surface is broad.
PoC
An attacker sends a like request with an injected videos_id:
POST /objects/likeAjax.json.php
videos_id=1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -
This causes the backend to execute:
SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = 1 AND videos_id = 1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- - LIMIT 1;
Result: full database read — user credentials, emails, private content, and any other data accessible to the MySQL user.
Impact
- Severity: High
- Authentication required: Yes (must be logged in to like a video), but all registered users qualify
- Impact: Full database read via UNION-based injection; potential for data modification or deletion depending on DB user privileges
- Fix: Replace the concatenation with a second
?placeholder and pass$this->videos_idas a bound integer parameter
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | 26.0composer require wwbn/avideo:^26.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update wwbn/avideo to 26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.