How severe is GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc?

GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc affects the following packages: wwbn/avideo (Packagist). Ecosystems affected: Packagist.

How do I fix GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc?

Update wwbn/avideo to 26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc in my Packagist dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc?

GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 39th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc?

GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is classified as SQL Injection (CWE-89). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc was published on March 26, 2026 and was last updated on March 27, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐘 Packagist

GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc

AVideo has SQL Injection via Partial Prepared Statement — videos_id Concatenated Directly into Query

Also known asCVE-2026-33767

Published

Mar 26, 2026

Updated

Mar 27, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk39th percentile+0.49%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

In objects/like.php, the getLike() method constructs a SQL query using a prepared statement placeholder (?) for users_id but directly concatenates $this->videos_id into the query string without parameterization. An attacker who can control the videos_id value (via a crafted request) can inject arbitrary SQL, bypassing the partial prepared-statement protection.

Details

File: objects/like.php

Vulnerable code:

$sql = "SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = ? AND videos_id = ".$this->videos_id." LIMIT 1;";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "i", [$this->users_id]);

The query mixes a parameterized placeholder for users_id with raw string concatenation for videos_id. The $this->videos_id value originates from user-supplied request input (typically a POST/GET parameter identifying the video being liked/disliked) and is not cast to integer or validated before being embedded in the SQL string.

All other queries in the same file correctly use ? placeholders for both columns:

// Correct pattern used elsewhere:
$sql = "SELECT count(*) as total FROM likes WHERE videos_id = ? AND like = 1";

The inconsistency means any attacker who can submit a like/dislike action with a crafted videos_id can inject SQL. Since like/dislike actions are typically available to any authenticated user, the attack surface is broad.

PoC

An attacker sends a like request with an injected videos_id:

POST /objects/likeAjax.json.php
videos_id=1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -

This causes the backend to execute:

SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = 1 AND videos_id = 1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- - LIMIT 1;

Result: full database read — user credentials, emails, private content, and any other data accessible to the MySQL user.

Impact

Severity: High
Authentication required: Yes (must be logged in to like a video), but all registered users qualify
Impact: Full database read via UNION-based injection; potential for data modification or deletion depending on DB user privileges
Fix: Replace the concatenation with a second ? placeholder and pass $this->videos_id as a bound integer parameter

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐘Packagist	`wwbn/avideo`	all versions	26.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update wwbn/avideo to 26.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In `objects/like.php`, the `getLike()` method constructs a SQL query using a prepared statement placeholder (`?`) for `users_id` but directly concatenates `$this->videos_id` into the query string without parameterization. An attacker who can control the `videos_id` value (via a crafted request) can inject arbitrary SQL, bypassing the partial prepared-statement protection. ### Details **File:** `objects/like.php` **Vulnerable code:** ```php $sql = "SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = ? AND videos_id = ".$this->videos_id." LIMIT 1;"; $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "i", [$this->use

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc in your dependencies?

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