ZITADEL: Actions V1 sandbox escape: host file read via require()GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf
HIGHFix: zitadel/zitadel@afe1086GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf is a high-severity (CVSS 8.7) CWE-284 vulnerability in github.com/zitadel/zitadel. A fix is available for github.com/zitadel/zitadel — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,415 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/zitadel/zitadelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A vulnerability in ZITADEL Actions V1 allows an organization Action author to read files from the ZITADEL host filesystem through the JavaScript require() module loader. On common self-hosted deployments this can be chained to steal bootstrap credentials (including the Login Client PAT) and escalate from a single-tenant organization owner to instance administrator.
Impact
ZITADEL Actions V1 run custom JavaScript inside the ZITADEL server process at OIDC, SAML, and login-flow trigger points. The runtime enables the goja Node-compatible require() registry without restricting the source loader, so Action scripts can load host files readable by the ZITADEL process (notably .js and .json, and in some cases other file contents via error channels).
An attacker with ORG_OWNER on any organization (which includes org.action.write and org.flow.write) can therefore:
- Read process-readable host files, including configuration or secrets mounted into the API container (for example service-account material, projected secrets, or config carrying sensitive values).
- On deployments that follow ZITADEL’s documented bootstrap paths (
ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_LOGINCLIENTPATPATH,ZITADEL_FIRSTINSTANCE_MACHINEKEYPATH), recover instance-wide credentials such as the IAM_LOGIN_CLIENT PAT or the IAM_OWNER service-account key, enabling escalation to full instance control.
This collapses the expected multi-tenant isolation boundary: a tenant organization administrator is not meant to access host filesystem secrets or instance-wide credentials.
Scope note: This issue affects Actions V1. Host command execution was not identified as part of this vulnerability. Impact depends on what the ZITADEL process can read on disk and on deployment layout — documented Compose and quick-start setups that write bootstrap PATs or machine keys into the API container amplify severity.
Affected Versions
Systems running one of the following versions are affected:
- 4.x:
4.0.0through4.16.0(including RC versions) - 3.x:
3.0.0through3.4.12(including RC versions)
Patches
The vulnerability has been addressed in the latest releases. The patch disables filesystem-backed module loading for Action scripts so that only the intended native zitadel/* modules can be required.
Workarounds
If an immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Restrict who can create, update, or attach Actions — do not grant
org.action.write/org.flow.write(or ORG_OWNER) to untrusted administrators in multi-tenant environments. - Audit existing Actions for
require()of filesystem paths. - Remove or relocate bootstrap credential files (
login-client.pat, machine keys) so they are not readable inside the API process filesystem. - Limit host filesystem exposure for the ZITADEL process (no unnecessary readable secrets beside the binary).
Questions
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please email us at [email protected]
Credits
Thanks to Dor Konis (@dkonis) and Feras Daragma (@FerasTr) from GE Vernova, and to pyuysig, for finding and reporting this vulnerability.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/zitadel/zitadel | all versions | 1.80.0-v2.20.0.20260717062331-baf6ed501b68go get github.com/zitadel/zitadel@v1.80.0-v2.20.0.20260717062331-baf6ed501b68 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/zitadel/zitadel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/zitadel/zitadel to 1.80.0-v2.20.0.20260717062331-baf6ed501b68 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fgmf-7rf8-m6vf in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.