GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4
Vantage6: Set admin user and password from environment or configuration
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
vantage6Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username root and password root. This is not ideal for the following reasons:
- Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username
rootthat probably has admin rights - The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it.
Patches
No
Workarounds
It is possible to delete the root user after it has been used to create other users
References
We could consider doing this like mongodb
Additional info
Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it:
diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644
--- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
+++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
@@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp:
# TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal
root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root")
- log.warn(
- f"Creating root user: "
- f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, "
- f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}"
- )
+ # Temporary patch
+ # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided
+ # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver
+ # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed
+ # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on
+ # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this.
+ if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"):
+ with open(
+ os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE")
+ ) as password_file:
+ initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip()
+ log.info(
+ f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"
+ )
+ else:
+ initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"]
+ log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!")
user = db.User(
username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"],
roles=[root],
organization=org,
email="[email protected]",
- password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"],
+ password=initial_root_password,
failed_login_attempts=0,
last_login_attempt=None,
)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | vantage6 | all versions | 5.0.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vantage6. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update vantage6 to 5.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.