Vantage6: Set admin user and password from environment or configurationGHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4
GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 is a CWE-204 vulnerability in vantage6. A fix is available for vantage6 — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
vantage6Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username root and password root. This is not ideal for the following reasons:
- Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username
rootthat probably has admin rights - The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it.
Patches
No
Workarounds
It is possible to delete the root user after it has been used to create other users
References
We could consider doing this like mongodb
Additional info
Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it:
diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644
--- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
+++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py
@@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp:
# TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal
root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root")
- log.warn(
- f"Creating root user: "
- f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, "
- f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}"
- )
+ # Temporary patch
+ # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided
+ # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver
+ # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed
+ # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on
+ # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this.
+ if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"):
+ with open(
+ os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE")
+ ) as password_file:
+ initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip()
+ log.info(
+ f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"
+ )
+ else:
+ initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"]
+ log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!")
user = db.User(
username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"],
roles=[root],
organization=org,
email="[email protected]",
- password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"],
+ password=initial_root_password,
failed_login_attempts=0,
last_login_attempt=None,
)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | vantage6 | all versions | 5.0.0pip install --upgrade 'vantage6==5.0.0' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vantage6, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update vantage6 to 5.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fgmc-2hqj-86v4 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.