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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v

GuardDog Zip Bomb Vulnerability in safe_extract() Allows DoS

Also known asCVE-2026-22870
Published
Jan 13, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk34th percentile+0.38%
0.00%0.31%0.62%0.93%0.0%0.4%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍guarddog

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GuardDog's safe_extract() function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data.

Vulnerability Details

Affected Component: guarddog/utils/archives.py - safe_extract() function
Vulnerability Type: CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb)
Severity: HIGH (CVSS ~8)
Attack Vector: Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or local

Root Cause

The safe_extract() function handles TAR files securely using the tarsafe library, but ZIP file extraction has no size validation:

elif zipfile.is_zipfile(source_archive):
    with zipfile.ZipFile(source_archive, "r") as zip:
        for file in zip.namelist():
            zip.extract(file, path=os.path.join(target_directory, file))

Missing protections:

  • ❌ No decompressed size limit
  • ❌ No compression ratio validation
  • ❌ No file count limits
  • ❌ No total extracted size validation

Impact

Denial of Service Scenarios

1. CI/CD Pipeline Disruption

  • Attacker publishes malicious package to PyPI
  • Developer adds package to requirements.txt
  • CI/CD runs GuardDog scan
  • Disk fills (GitHub Actions: standard 14GB limit)
  • All deployments blocked

2. Resource Exhaustion

  • Local development environments
  • Security scanning infrastructure
  • Automated scanning systems
  • Docker containers with limited disk

3. Supply Chain Attack Amplification

  • Single malicious package blocks security scanning
  • Prevents detection of other malicious packages
  • Forces manual intervention
  • Increases security team workload

Recommended Fix

Add size validation for ZIP files similar to what tarsafe provides for TAR files

Configuration Options

Make limits configurable via environment variables or config file

Additional Improvements

  1. Add warning logs when archives approach limits
  2. Provide clear error messages for users
  3. Document limits in user-facing documentation
  4. Add tests for zip bomb detection
  5. Consider using a safe ZIP library (similar to tarsafe)

Credit

Reported by: Charbel (dwbruijn)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIguarddogall versions2.7.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for guarddog. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update guarddog to 2.7.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary GuardDog's `safe_extract()` function does not validate decompressed file sizes when extracting ZIP archives (wheels, eggs), allowing attackers to cause denial of service through zip bombs. A malicious package can consume gigabytes of disk space from a few megabytes of compressed data. ## Vulnerability Details **Affected Component:** `guarddog/utils/archives.py` - `safe_extract()` function **Vulnerability Type:** CWE-409 - Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Zip Bomb) **Severity:** HIGH (CVSS ~8) **Attack Vector:** Network (malicious package uploaded to PyPI/npm) or
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-ffj4-jq7m-9g6v across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.