GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) CWE-863 vulnerability in snipe/snipe-it. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Snipe-IT has an authorization bypass on print inventory page
Real-World Exposure
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Description
Impact
An authenticated user with only users.view can open another user's detail page and see assigned license, accessory, and consumable data even though the same account is denied direct access to the Licenses, Accessories, and Consumables modules. The leaked data includes software license names, purchase order/order values, accessory and consumable names, assignment notes, and purchase costs.
Attacker Model
Authenticated user with only:
{"users.view":"1"}
The attacker does not have:
{
"licenses.view": "1",
"accessories.view": "1",
"consumables.view": "1",
"assets.view": "1"
}
Affected Component
-
app/Http/Controllers/Users/UsersController.php -
resources/views/users/view.blade.php -
resources/views/users/print.blade.php -
Endpoints:
-
GET /users/{user} -
GET /users/{user}/print
-
Root Cause
UsersController::show() authorizes only viewing the user, then loads inventory relationships:
$this->authorize('view', $user);
$user = User::with([
'consumables',
'accessories',
'licenses',
'userloc',
'groups',
])
resources/views/users/view.blade.php renders those relationships without checking the corresponding module permissions. The license table renders name, purchase cost, purchase order, and order number. The accessory and consumable tables render item names, notes, and unit costs.
UsersController::printInventory() similarly authorizes only view on User::class and the target user, then renders resources/views/users/print.blade.php, which outputs assigned inventory names.
Proof of Concept
-
Create a user with only
users.view. -
Create a target user with assigned license/accessory/consumable records containing recognizable test values.
-
Log in as the
users.view-only user. -
Confirm direct module access is denied:
GET /licenses
GET /accessories
GET /consumables
Observed for each:
HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden
- Request the target user's page:
GET /users/<target-user-id> HTTP/1.1
Host: <snipe-it-host>
Cookie: snipeit_session=<attacker-session>
Observed:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
The response contained assigned inventory data from modules the attacker could not directly access, including license name, purchase order/order values, accessory name/note/cost, and consumable name/note/cost.
- Request the print view:
GET /users/<target-user-id>/print HTTP/1.1
Host: <snipe-it-host>
Cookie: snipeit_session=<attacker-session>
Observed:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
The response contained assigned inventory names.
Evidence
The users.view-only test account was confirmed to lack direct inventory permissions:
{
"has_users_view": true,
"has_licenses_view": false,
"has_accessories_view": false,
"has_consumables_view": false,
"has_assets_view": false
}
Direct access to /licenses, /accessories, and /consumables returned 403 Forbidden.
The same account received 200 OK from /users/<target-user-id> and the response included assigned inventory data that should have been protected by the corresponding inventory module permissions.
Negative Controls
Denied direct module responses did not include the test inventory strings. The same data was only disclosed through the user detail and user print views.
Impact
Organizations may use separate permissions to allow HR/helpdesk-style users to view people records without exposing license, accessory, or consumable inventories and cost/order metadata. This issue bypasses those module-specific permissions and leaks assigned inventory information through the user view.
Patches
Patched in 374f426f0c
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | snipe/snipe-it | all versions | 8.6.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for snipe/snipe-it. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update snipe/snipe-it to 8.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-fc33-6w3q-538h across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.