Crawl4AI: LLM credential exfiltration in Docker server via request base_url and env: token resolutionGHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq
HIGHGHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Information Exposure vulnerability in crawl4ai. A fix is available for crawl4ai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 397,508 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
crawl4aiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Docker API server let a request control where LLM calls were sent and which environment variable an LLM token resolved from. Both could be abused to exfiltrate server-held secrets. The Docker API is unauthenticated by default.
Vector 1 - attacker base_url
/md, /llm, and /llm/job accepted a base_url in the request and used it as the LLM endpoint while still attaching the server's configured provider API key. An attacker set base_url to a server they control and received the provider key (and any provider keys the server holds) in the inbound request.
Vector 2 - arbitrary environment variable read via env:
LLMConfig(api_token="env:NAME") resolved NAME from the server environment with os.getenv. Because request bodies were deserialized into LLMConfig (via a crawler config / extraction strategy), an attacker could set api_token="env:SECRET_KEY" (or env:REDIS_PASSWORD, etc.) and, paired with an attacker base_url, exfiltrate that secret. Reading the server's SECRET_KEY enables forging authentication tokens.
Impact
Disclosure of LLM provider API keys and other server secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint; reading the JWT SECRET_KEY can lead to authentication bypass.
Fix
- The LLM endpoints ignore a request-supplied
base_url; the endpoint is always derived server-side from the provider name. The field is still accepted but no longer honored (no breaking 4xx). LLMConfigrefusesenv:resolution of protected environment-variable names (names containing SECRET/PASSWORD/PRIVATE, prefixes CRAWL4AI*/AWS_SECRET*, and SECRET_KEY/REDIS_PASSWORD/TOKEN). Normal provider keys (e.g. OPENAI_API_KEY) are unaffected.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to the patched version.
- Enable authentication (
CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN). - Do not place sensitive secrets in the server environment alongside provider keys.
Credits
- Geo (geo-chen) - reported the LLM credential exfiltration via request base_url.
- Internal security audit (Crawl4AI maintainers) - the env: arbitrary-variable read.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | crawl4ai | all versions | 0.8.8pip install --upgrade 'crawl4ai==0.8.8' |
Affected Products
crawl4aikidocodeDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for crawl4ai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update crawl4ai to 0.8.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Do not deserialise data from untrusted sources: where the format allows it, restrict deserialisation to an explicit allowlist of expected types, and prefer a data-only format (JSON, Protobuf) over one that can reconstruct arbitrary objects until you can upgrade.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f989-c77f-r2cq in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.