GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg
HIGHEthermint vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/evmos/ethermint🐹github.com/evmos/evmos🐹github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos🐹github.com/Kava-Labs/kavaReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Vulnerability Report
Impact
Smart contract applications that make use of the selfdestruct functionality and their end-users.
Classification
The vulnerability has been classified as high with a CVSS score of 8.2. It has the potential to create a denial-of-service to all contracts that can invoke the selfdestruct function to destroy a smart contract.
Users Impacted
Due to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. User funds and balances are safe.
Disclosure
In Ethermint running versions before v0.17.2, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the DeleteAccount function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE.
Additional Details
The same contract bytecode can be deployed multiple times to create multiple contract instances. In the internal database, the bytecode is stored as a key-value entry bytecode hash --> bytecode which is shared by those contracts. Unfortunately, when one of the contracts invokes selfdestruct, it will remove the corresponding bytecode hash -> bytecode entry, and thus it disables all the contracts that share the same bytecode.
The attack scenario is as follows:
- The malicious attacker identifies a vulnerable contract that can invoke
selfdestruct - The attacker deploys a copy of the contract with identical bytecode
- Finally, the attacker triggers the
selfdestructoperation on their redeployed contract, actively causing a DoS on the original and vulnerable contract. All transactions will fail until a workaround is used (see below).
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint versions ≥v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required.
Details
The patch removes the bytecode deletion logic, i.e. contract bytecodes are never deleted from the internal database after the patch.
At the moment, Ethermint does not track how many times each bytecode is used, and thus it cannot determine if it is safe to delete a particular bytecode on selfdestruct invocations. This behavior is the same with go-ethereum.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered.
The new contract deployment restores the bytecode hash -> bytecode entry in the internal state.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the Core Team in Discord
- Open a discussion in evmos/ethermint
- Email us at [email protected] for security questions
- For Press, email us at [email protected].
Credits
Thanks to the
- Cronos Team: @yihuang and @tomtau for discovering the issue, @gakuzen-crypto, @polycryptics, @FinnZhangCrypto, @wilson-ang, @brianatcrypto for the impact analysis.
- Evmos Team: @facs95 for patching the issue and @fedekunze for managing the release and coordinating between teams.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/ethermint | all versions | 0.18.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/evmos/evmos | all versions | 7.0.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/crypto-org-chain/cronos | all versions | 0.7.1-rc2 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/Kava-Labs/kava | all versions | 0.18.0 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/evmos/ethermint. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/evmos/ethermint to 0.18.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-f92v-grc2-w2fg across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.