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📦 npm

GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3

MEDIUM

Nodejs ‘undici’ vulnerable to CRLF Injection via Content-Type

Also known asCVE-2022-35948
Published
Aug 18, 2022
Updated
Nov 8, 2023
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk64th percentile+1.04%
0.00%0.57%1.14%1.70%0.2%1.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

undicinpm
135.9Mdownloads / week

Description

Impact

=< [email protected] users are vulnerable to CRLF Injection on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the content-type header.

Example:

import { request } from 'undici'

const unsanitizedContentTypeInput =  'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1'

await request('http://localhost:3000, {
    method: 'GET',
    headers: {
      'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput
    },
})

The above snippet will perform two requests in a single request API call:

  1. http://localhost:3000/
  2. http://localhost:3000/foo2

Patches

This issue was patched in Undici v5.8.1

Workarounds

Sanitize input when sending content-type headers using user input.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmundiciall versions5.8.2
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for undici. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update undici to 5.8.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact `=< [email protected]` users are vulnerable to _CRLF Injection_ on headers when using unsanitized input as request headers, more specifically, inside the `content-type` header. Example: ``` import { request } from 'undici' const unsanitizedContentTypeInput = 'application/json\r\n\r\nGET /foo2 HTTP/1.1' await request('http://localhost:3000, { method: 'GET', headers: { 'content-type': unsanitizedContentTypeInput }, }) ``` The above snippet will perform two requests in a single `request` API call: 1) `http://localhost:3000/` 2) `http://localhost:3000/foo2` ### Pat
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f772-66g8-q5h3 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.