OliveTin: ValidateArgumentType API Endpoint's Missing Authentication Allows Action and Argument EnumerationGHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx
LOWFix: OliveTin/OliveTin@a386570GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx is a low-severity (CVSS 3.7) CWE-862 vulnerability in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin. A fix is available for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 397,508 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTinReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The ValidateArgumentType RPC endpoint in service/internal/api/api.go does not perform any authentication or authorization checks. Unlike all other data-returning API endpoints, it does not call auth.UserFromApiCall or checkDashboardAccess. When AuthRequireGuestsToLogin is enabled (the security-conscious configuration), this endpoint remains accessible to unauthenticated users and can be used as an oracle to enumerate valid action binding IDs and their argument configurations.
Details
Root Cause
The ValidateArgumentType handler at service/internal/api/api.go:726 has no authentication check:
func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) {
if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId))
}
err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg)
desc := ""
if err != nil {
desc = err.Error()
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{
Valid: err == nil,
Description: desc,
}), nil
}
Compare this with adjacent endpoints that DO have auth checks:
// WhoAmI - has auth check
func (api *oliveTinAPI) WhoAmI(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.WhoAmIRequest]) ... {
user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
...
}
// GetDashboard - has auth check
func (api *oliveTinAPI) GetDashboard(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.GetDashboardRequest]) ... {
user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
...
}
Oracle Behavior
The endpoint provides different responses based on whether the binding and argument exist:
-
Valid binding + valid argument: Returns
{valid: true/false, description: "..."}(200 OK) -
Valid binding + invalid argument: Returns
CodeNotFounderror -
Invalid binding: Returns
CodeNotFounderror
While the error messages for the last two cases are identical, an attacker who knows a valid binding ID (or can guess one from action title SHA256) can enumerate argument names by observing which ones return 200 OK vs CodeNotFound.
Binding ID Predictability
Binding IDs are SHA256 hashes of action titles (see service/internal/executor/executor_actions.go). Since action titles are typically short, human-readable strings (e.g., "Ping", "Restart Service", "Deploy"), an attacker can precompute hashes of likely titles and test them against this endpoint.
Scope
This finding is only meaningful when AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: true is configured. In the default configuration where guests have full dashboard access, the action information is already visible through the dashboard API.
When AuthRequireGuestsToLogin is true, checkDashboardAccess blocks guest access to other endpoints but NOT to ValidateArgumentType.
PoC
Prerequisites
- OliveTin instance with
AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: trueconfigured
Step 1: Verify other endpoints require auth
Confirm that regular endpoints reject unauthenticated requests:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{}"
# Returns: CodePermissionDenied - "guests are not allowed to access the dashboard"
Step 2: Enumerate binding IDs via ValidateArgumentType
Test candidate binding IDs (SHA256 of guessed action titles):
# Test if an action titled "Ping" exists
BINDING_ID=$(echo -n "Ping" | sha256sum | cut -d" " -f1)
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"test\",\"value\":\"x\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}"
# If action exists: returns CodeNotFound (argument "test" not found for this binding)
# If action does not exist: returns CodeNotFound (same message, but confirms the oracle)
Step 3: Enumerate argument names for a known binding
Once a valid binding ID is known, brute-force argument names:
# Test if argument "target" exists for the Ping action
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/ValidateArgumentType \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"bindingId\":\"$BINDING_ID\",\"argumentName\":\"target\",\"value\":\"test\",\"type\":\"ascii\"}"
# If argument exists: returns {valid: true/false} (200 OK) -- CONFIRMED
# If argument does not exist: returns CodeNotFound error
Impact
-
Information Disclosure: Unauthenticated users can enumerate which actions exist (by testing binding IDs) and which arguments each action accepts (by testing argument names). This reveals the server configuration to unauthorized parties.
-
Reconnaissance for Further Attacks: The enumerated information (action names, argument names, argument types) provides valuable reconnaissance for more targeted attacks such as the
ot_prefix argument injection (see advisory 001) or social engineering. -
Limited Scope: This is only exploitable when
AuthRequireGuestsToLogin: trueis configured. In the default configuration, guests already have full access to the dashboard which exposes the same information.
Recommended Fix
Add authentication and dashboard access checks to the ValidateArgumentType handler, consistent with all other data-returning endpoints:
func (api *oliveTinAPI) ValidateArgumentType(ctx ctx.Context, req *connect.Request[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeRequest]) (*connect.Response[apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse], error) {
// Add auth check consistent with other endpoints
user := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
if err := api.checkDashboardAccess(user); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if api.argumentNotFoundForValidation(req.Msg) {
return nil, connect.NewError(connect.CodeNotFound, fmt.Errorf("action or argument not found for binding ID %s", req.Msg.BindingId))
}
err := api.validateArgumentTypeInternal(req.Msg)
desc := ""
if err != nil {
desc = err.Error()
}
return connect.NewResponse(&apiv1.ValidateArgumentTypeResponse{
Valid: err == nil,
Description: desc,
}), nil
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | all versions | 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854go get github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin@v0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to 0.0.0-20260521230847-a3865704c854 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f637-w7p2-m7fx in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.