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GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33

HIGHFix: WWBN/AVideo@2375eb5

GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in WWBN/AVideo. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

WWBN AVideo's GIF poster fetch bypasses traversal scrubbing and exposes local files through public media URLs

Also known asCVE-2026-39369
Published
Apr 8, 2026
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐘WWBN/AVideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.

The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as /etc/passwd or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.

Details

The vulnerable chain was:

  1. objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php accepted attacker-controlled downloadURL_gifimage
  2. traversal scrubbing used str_replace('../', '', ...), which was bypassable with overlapping input such as ....//
  3. same-origin /videos/... URLs were accepted
  4. url_get_contents() and try_get_contents_from_local() resolved the request into a local filesystem read
  5. the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination
  6. invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk

This made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.

Proof of concept

  1. Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow.
  2. Send:
POST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php
downloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd
  1. Query:
GET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1
  1. Recover the generated GIF URL from videosURL.gif.url.
  2. Download that GIF URL.
  3. Observe that the body matches the target local file, such as /etc/passwd, byte-for-byte.

Impact

An authenticated uploader can read server-local files and republish them through a public GIF media URL by supplying a crafted same-origin /videos/... path to downloadURL_gifimage. Because traversal scrubbing was bypassable and the fetched bytes were written to the GIF destination without effective invalid-image cleanup, successful exploitation allows disclosure of files such as /etc/passwd, readable application source code, or deployment-specific configuration accessible to the application.

Recommended fix

  • Reject any remote image URL whose decoded path contains traversal markers
  • Do not allow attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... fetches to resolve into local file reads
  • Constrain any local shortcut path handling with realpath() and strict base-directory allowlists
  • Validate GIF content before saving it into public media storage
  • Ensure invalid-image cleanup checks the correct destination path

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘PackagistWWBN/AVideoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for WWBN/AVideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of WWBN/AVideo has shipped for GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin `/videos/...` URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path. The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as `/etc/passwd` or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL. ## Details The vulnerable chain was: 1. `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `downloadURL_gifimage` 2. traversal scrubbing used `str_re
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-f4f9-627c-jh33 across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.