Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV

Echo: BodyDump captures request and response bodies without size limits in v4GHSA-f48p-c9v4-h7xv

Fix: labstack/echo#3105

GHSA-f48p-c9v4-h7xv is a security vulnerability in github.com/labstack/echo/v4. A fix is available for github.com/labstack/echo/v4 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/labstack/echo/v4

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Echo v4's opt-in BodyDump middleware read complete request bodies into memory and retained complete response bodies without a capture limit. A client able to submit large requests to a route using BodyDump could cause large allocations before the application handler ran. Large responses, including responses whose size can be influenced by a client, also caused an additional unbounded capture allocation.

Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust process memory and cause denial of service. BodyDump is not enabled by default. Deployments with effective request limits may reduce the request-side exposure; response capture requires separate consideration.

Affected versions and patch

Echo v4 versions through v4.16.0 are affected. Upgrade to v4.16.1.

The patch adds BodyDumpConfig.MaxRequestBytes and MaxResponseBytes, each defaulting to 5 MiB when zero. A value of -1 explicitly restores unlimited capture. The complete request remains readable by the handler and the complete response is delivered to the client; only the callback's captured data is bounded. Request close behavior and read errors are preserved.

Fix commit.

Workarounds

Disable BodyDump on exposed routes, particularly large uploads and downloads. Alternatively, enforce body-size limits before BodyDump and independently bound the responses that the application generates.

Credits

Reported by @q490107865. The patch also incorporates request-body preservation work from @jakezwang in #3105.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/labstack/echo/v4≥ 4.0.0&&< 4.16.14.16.1go get github.com/labstack/echo/v4@v4.16.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/labstack/echo/v4, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/labstack/echo/v4 to 4.16.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f48p-c9v4-h7xv is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact Echo v4's opt-in BodyDump middleware read complete request bodies into memory and retained complete response bodies without a capture limit. A client able to submit large requests to a route using BodyDump could cause large allocations before the application handler ran. Large responses, including responses whose size can be influenced by a client, also caused an additional unbounded capture allocation. Repeated or concurrent requests can exhaust process memory and cause denial of service. BodyDump is not enabled by default. Deployments with effective request limits may reduce the
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-f48p-c9v4-h7xv in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

Echo: BodyDump captures request and response bodies…