GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7
MEDIUMGHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-674 vulnerability in protobufjs. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
protobufjs : Schema-derived names can shadow runtime-significant properties
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 369,023 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
protobufjsnpmprotobufjs-clinpmDescription
Summary
protobufjs accepted certain schema-derived names that could collide with properties used by protobufjs runtime helpers. The known affected names are fields named hasOwnProperty, field or oneof names such as $type when loaded through protobufjs JSON/reflection descriptors, and service methods whose generated helper name is rpcCall.
When affected message or service types were used, protobufjs could read schema-controlled data where it expected an own-property helper, reflected type metadata, or the base RPC helper. This could cause deterministic exceptions or recursive calls in affected decode post-checks, verification, object conversion, reflected JSON serialization, or protobufjs RPC helper invocation.
Impact
An attacker who can provide or influence protobuf schemas or protobufjs JSON descriptors may be able to make affected message or service types unusable, resulting in denial of service for the affected processing path.
Applications using only trusted schemas are affected only if those schemas contain one of the problematic names and the application reaches the affected API path.
The issue is not known to allow code execution by itself.
Preconditions
- The application must use an affected protobufjs version.
- The application must load or use a schema or protobufjs JSON descriptor containing one of the problematic names:
- a field named
hasOwnProperty, - a field or oneof named
$typethrough protobufjs JSON/reflection descriptor input, - or a service method whose generated helper name is
rpcCall.
- a field named
- The application must reach the affected API path for that name: required-field decode post-checks,
verify, ortoObjectforhasOwnProperty; reflected message JSON serialization for$type; or protobufjs RPC service invocation forrpcCall.
Workarounds
Do not load protobuf schemas or protobufjs JSON descriptors from untrusted sources with affected versions. If untrusted schemas or descriptors must be accepted, validate schema-derived field, oneof, and service method names before loading and reject the problematic names described above.
Applications using trusted schemas can avoid the issue by renaming affected fields or service methods, or by avoiding the affected API path.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | protobufjs | all versions | 7.6.3 |
| 📦npm | protobufjs-cli | ≥ 2.0.0&&< 2.5.1 | 2.5.1 |
| 📦npm | protobufjs-cli | all versions | 1.3.3 |
| 📦npm | protobufjs | ≥ 8.0.0&&< 8.6.0 | 8.6.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for protobufjs. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update protobufjs to 7.6.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-f38q-mgvj-vph7 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.