GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5
MEDIUMNetty: QUIC stateless reset token material exposed through header-visible connection IDs
Blast Radius
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Description
Summary
Netty QUIC exposes the stateless reset token on the network path when using the default HMAC-based connection-ID and stateless-reset-token generators. The reset token for the server's current source connection ID can be derived from bytes that appear as the connection ID in QUIC headers after a source-CID rotation. An on-path attacker observing the headers can use the token to perform a Denial of Service by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset packet.
Details
The sign-based connection ID generator (HmacSignQuicConnectionIdGenerator) and reset token generator (HmacSignQuicResetTokenGenerator) both evaluate HMAC-SHA256 with the same JVM-wide static key (io.netty.handler.codec.quic.Hmac).
During source CID rotation (QuicheQuicChannel.newSourceConnectionIds), the current server source CID C is used as input to produce the next CID N. The stateless reset token for C is defined over HMAC(K, C), specifically the first 16 bytes. The next CID N is the first L bytes of the same digest, where L = |C|.
Whenever L ≥ 16, the first 16 bytes of N are exactly the stateless reset token for C. Because N is carried in QUIC headers as a connection ID, an observer can read the headers and learn the reset token without decrypting the payload.
This directly violates RFC 9000
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-calculating-a-stateless-res: The stateless reset token MUST be difficult to guess.
Additionally https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-stateless-reset-oracle
Impact
Information Disclosure and Denial of Service. An on-path attacker can obtain the stateless reset token from the connection ID header and attempt to abruptly close the client side of the connection by sending a spoofed Stateless Reset datagram.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic | ≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.15.Final | 4.2.15.Final |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic to 4.2.15.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-cq4q-cv5g-r8q5 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.