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CRITICAL severity

GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3

CRITICALFix: free5gc/nef#23

GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) vulnerability in github.com/free5gc/nef. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

free5GC's NEF nnef-oam route group is unauthenticated; no-token requests reach the OAM handler

Also known asCVE-2026-44327GO-2026-5326
Published
May 8, 2026
Updated
Jul 21, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Jul 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/free5gc/nef

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

free5GC's NEF mounts the nnef-oam route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can hit the OAM route with no Authorization header at all and the handler returns 200 OK. The current OAM handler is a stub that returns null, but the structural defect is route-group-scoped: the entire OAM route group has no inbound auth middleware, so every future OAM operation added to this group inherits the missing auth boundary by default. Same root cause as the NEF traffic-influence and PFD-management findings.

Details

Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.

  • Source repo tag: v4.2.1
  • Running Docker image: free5gc/nef:v4.2.0
  • Runtime NEF commit: 5ce35eab
  • Docker validation date: 2026-03-11

NEF advertises OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true, yet the OAM route group is mounted without any inbound auth middleware and answers unauthenticated GETs with 200 OK.

Code evidence (paths in free5gc/nef):

  • OAM route group mounted without auth middleware: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:60
  • OAM route exposed at /: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_oam.go:9
  • OAM processor returns 200 OK directly: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/oam.go:9
  • NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (GetTokenCtx); there is no inbound authorization path: NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153

PoC

Reproduced against the running NEF at http://10.100.200.19:8000 with no Authorization header:

curl -i http://10.100.200.19:8000/nnef-oam/v1/

Observed output:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
null

NEF container logs (docker logs nef) show the request being served while OAuth is enabled:

[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET | /nnef-oam/v1/

Impact

Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on the NEF OAM SBI route group. Severity is scored against the OAM route group's intended capability surface (Operations / Administration / Maintenance), NOT against the current stub handler. The current handler is a stub that returns null, but the defect is route-group-scoped: there is no auth middleware on the group at all, so every future OAM operation added behind this group inherits the missing inbound auth boundary by default.

Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI can:

  • Probe and enumerate the OAM route surface anonymously today.
  • Hit any future OAM-group endpoint (read, modify, restart-style operations) anonymously, because the auth boundary does not exist for this group.

Operators who assume OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true enforces inbound auth on NEF are wrong for this route group.

Affected: free5gc v4.2.1.

Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/861 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/free5gc/nefall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/free5gc/nef. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of github.com/free5gc/nef has shipped for GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary free5GC's NEF mounts the `nnef-oam` route group without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can hit the OAM route with no `Authorization` header at all and the handler returns `200 OK`. The current OAM handler is a stub that returns `null`, but the structural defect is route-group-scoped: the entire OAM route group has no inbound auth middleware, so every future OAM operation added to this group inherits the missing auth boundary by default. Same root cause as the NEF traffic-influence and PFD-management findings. ### Details
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-cmpj-2x3g-m7g3: nef (Critical 10) | O3 Security